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Opting Out of Discovery
Jay Tidmarsh*
This Article proposes a system in which both parties are provided
an opportunity to opt out of discovery. A party who opts out is immunized
from dispositive motions, including a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim or a motion for summary judgment. If neither party opts
out of discovery, the parties waive jury-trial rights, thus giving judges
the ability to use stronger case-management powers to focus the issues
and narrow discovery. If one party opts out of discovery but an opponent
does not, the cost of discovery shifts to the opponent. This Article justifies
this proposal in both historical and efficiency terms and concludes by
considering objections to the proposal.
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INTRODUCTION
As the recurring efforts to reform the discovery rules over the
past thirty-five years attest,' discovery is controversial. The basic
critiques-costliness and, relatedly, potential for abuse-are a by-
product of discovery's effectiveness in unearthing a vast array of
information of possible consequence to resolving lawsuits.2 These
critiques are leveled not just by domestic reformers. On the world stage,
the capaciousness of discovery is viewed as a primary instance of the
American legal exceptionalism that other countries seek to avoid at all
costs.3
1. For a description of the range of direct and indirect efforts to reform discovery since 1983,
see infra notes 8, 11, 39-40, 64-77 and accompanying text.
2. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) ("[T]he pretrial discovery process is broadly viewed as
dysfunctional, with litigants utilizing discovery excessively and abusively."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636 (1989):
[D]iscovery [is] both a tool for uncovering facts essential to accurate adjudication and a
weapon capable of imposing large and unjustifiable costs on one's adversary. Litigants
with weak cases have little use for bringing the facts to light and every reason to heap
costs on the adverse party . . . . The prospect of these higher costs leads the other side
to settle on favorable terms.
3. On the general topic of American legal exceptionalism, see Richard L. Marcus, Putting
American Procedural Exceptionalism into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005). On
the specific foreign critique of U.S.-style discovery, see Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global
Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299, 306-07 (2002), which observes:
[The number of discovery mechanisms available to the American lawyer as a matter of
right, the degree of party control over discovery, the extent to which liberal discovery
in the United States has become what almost looks like a constitutional right, and the
massive use of discovery of all kinds in a substantial number of cases surely sets us
apart.
(footnote omitted). See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil
Law Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1998) (describing both "anti-foreign
sentiment" and other reasons for foreign antipathy to U.S. discovery). One measure of the distaste
for U.S. discovery is the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, in which forty-two of the sixty-one
signatory countries either refuse to execute letters requesting pretrial discovery or impose limits
on the requests. See Status Table, Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil or Commercial Matters, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
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To a considerable extent, discovery may be a victim of bad press.
In a third or more of federal cases, no discovery occurs, and discovery
costs in most other cases are not burdensome.4 In the main, lawyers are
satisfied with the process, believing that it reveals the right amount of
information at a fair price.5 Data from state courts also show that
discovery costs constitute only a small fraction of the total recovery from
litigation6-surely a reasonable expenditure for a process that enhances
the accuracy of resolving disputes.
Although it seems to function well in most cases, discovery is
problematic in a small percentage of cases-often those with the
greatest informational content and therefore the greatest discovery
demands.7 Rather than attempting to isolate those cases and seek
solutions unique to their circumstances, however, reform efforts over
table/print/?cid=82 (last visited Sept. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/X86B-58XW] (listing signatory
countries and providing links to countries' reservations).
4. See James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice
Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 636 (1998) (reporting that no discovery occurred
in thirty-eight percent of cases in a sample and that "[d]iscovery is not a pervasive litigation cost
problem for the majority of cases"); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery
and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 530-31
(1998) (finding, in a sample of cases likely to involve discovery, that only eighty-five percent of
attorneys reported that discovery occurred and that the median cost of discovery was $13,000 per
client, about three percent of the stakes in the case).
5. See EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-
BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 27, 35 tbl.4, 37 tbl.5, 43 tbl.10 (Oct. 2009), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/
default/files/materials/08/CivilRulesSurvey2009.pdf [https://perma.ccEZ33-XYN5] (reporting
survey results in which a clear majority of both plaintiffs' and defense lawyers believed that
discovery revealed "just the right amount" of information, the median costs of discovery for
plaintiffs' lawyers was $15,000 and for defense lawyers $20,000, and the costs of discovery in
relation to the stakes of the litigation were 1.6 percent for plaintiffs and 3.3 percent for
defendants); Kakalik et al., supra note 4, at 636 ("Subjective information from our interviews with
lawyers also suggests that the median or typical case is not 'the problem.' "). Contra AM. COLL. OF
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., INTERIM REPORT 3-5 (2008), http://iaals.du.edulsites/default/files/documents/publications/
interimreportfinalforweb.pdf [https://perma.cclUXE6-MBZE] (describing survey results that
"confirm[] that there are serious problems in many parts of the civil justice system, . . . especially
the rules governing discovery").
6. See Eric Helland et al., Contingent Fee Litigation in New York City, 70 VAND. L. REV.
1971, 1988 (2017) (describing a random sample of New York tort cases in which the median for all
expenses, other than attorney's fees, was three percent of recoveries and the average was five
percent).
7. See Kakalik et al., supra note 4, at 636:
The empirical data show that any problems that may exist with discovery are
concentrated in a minority of the cases, and the evidence indicates that discovery costs
can be very high in some cases.... It is the minority of the cases with high discovery
costs that generate the anecdotal "parade of horribles" that dominates much of the
debate over discovery rules and discovery case management;
see also Willging et al., supra note 4, at 531 (reporting that five percent of lawyers reported that
the costs of discovery amounted to thirty-two percent of the amount at stake).
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the past thirty-five years have sought to make across-the-board changes
to the pretrial system. Aside from amendments restricting the scope of
discovery,8 reforms include the mandatory disclosure of some
information;9 heftier case-management powers for judges;10 change to
the standard for motions to dismiss (so that cases will not proceed as
easily to discovery);" and sanctions for filing frivolous pleadings,
discovery requests, and discovery responses.12
8. Amendments have reduced discovery's scope in numerous ways. First is the scope of
discovery itself. Prior to 2000, parties were to obtain discovery relevant to "the subject matter" of
the suit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (1999); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's
note to 2000 amendment. From 2000 until 2015, this scope shrank to discovery relevant to "any
party's claim or defense," with discovery "relevant to the subject matter" allowed only on a showing
of "good cause." See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2014); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory
committee's note to 2000 amendment. In 2015, the scope of discovery contracted again, so that
"subject matter" discovery is now eliminated and only discovery "relevant to any party's claim or
defense" is permitted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory
committee's note to 2015 amendment. Second, an amendment in 1983 created a proportionality
limit on discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment; see
also infra note 73 and accompanying text (tracing the development and changes to the
proportionality provisions from its inception in 1983 until 2015). Third, a 2006 amendment
established a special proportionality rule for electronically stored information; under this rule, a
party need not presumptively provide such information when it is "not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost," although the requesting party can still obtain the information
on a showing of "good cause." See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B)
advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (requiring initial disclosure of the identity of certain witnesses
and documents, disclosure of the identity and opinions of testifying experts and their opinions later
during the pretrial process, and disclosure of testifying witnesses and exhibits shortly before trial).
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)-(c).
11. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557-58 (2007) (imposing a plausibility
pleading standard in part because "proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive"); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (clarifying the scope of the plausibility standard and
noting that the main pleading rule, Rule 8, "does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff
armed with nothing more than conclusions"); cf. Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109
MICH. L. REV. 53 (2010) (arguing that Twombly's pleading standard requires limited discovery
opportunities that can help plaintiffs craft pleadings that are plausible). Whether the change to a
plausibility standard has had the intended effect remains uncertain. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL, at vii (2011),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/motioniqbal_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMD3-VCHE]
[hereinafter CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS] (noting that although the rate of filing motions to
dismiss rose after Twombly and Iqbal, the rate at which motions to dismiss were granted remained
unchanged except in one narrow category of cases); JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 1, 5 (2011),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012[Motionlqbal2.pdf [https:/perma.cc/2HJ2-P6V5]
(confirming these findings but noting that the "findings do not rule out the possibility that the
pleading standards established in Twombly and Iqbal may have a greater effect in narrower
categories of cases in which respondents must obtain the facts from movants in order to state a
claim").
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (imposing sanctions for frivolous pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)
(imposing sanctions for frivolous discovery or discovery responses). The 1993 amendments to Rule
11 partially retreated from the vigor of the 1983 amendment, which imposed greater sanctions for
frivolous pleadings. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment
(noting that a court must impose an appropriate sanction for a Rule 11 violation), with FED. R.
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These reform efforts are unlikely to achieve their goal of
reducing cost and ending abusive discovery practices. An ideal
discovery system produces only the information essential to resolve a
lawsuit by its best means (adjudication, settlement, or dismissal).
Production of information extraneous to this resolution must be kept to
a minimum, and production of information sought for abusive purposes
must be curtailed entirely. 13 To a significant degree, the architecture of
the existing discovery system reflects this ideal.14 The difficulty lies in
the application of the ideal, especially in an adversarial system.
To state the obvious, information is information: the purpose(s)
for which it is sought and the uses to which it may be put vary with
circumstances. In most cases it is too expensive-if even possible-to
determine, request by request, whether the discovery sought is
essential, extraneous, or abusive. This sorting problem has become
considerably more difficult in light of the explosion of information
generated through innovations like word processing and email.
The difficulties of sorting information piece by piece make
default rules attractive. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
contain some default rules. For instance, the parties' mandatory
obligation to disclose the identity of witnesses and documents that
support the parties' claims or defenses15 reveals more than is essential
to the lawsuit's resolution, but a flat rule of disclosure avoids expensive
inquiries that sort the essential from the extraneous. Commentators
have offered other default rules to pare discovery to its essence. Many
of these proposals rely on economic incentives: for instance, making the
person seeking discovery pay for itl6 or requiring a plaintiff who fails to
CIv. P. 11(c) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment (noting that changes in Rule 11 made
sanctions discretionary and created a safe-harbor provision).
13. Cf. Gerry L. Spence, How to Make a Complex Case Come Alive for a Jury, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1, 1986, at 62, 65 ("Give me the 20 documents in the case of 200,000 documents. The rest only
obscure what there is to see. Give me the story-please, the story.").
14. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limit discovery only to material that is relevant and
proportional to the needs of the case. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1). The rules also impose sanctions
for frivolous or abusive discovery practices. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)-(b).
Case-management practices such as early and firm discovery deadlines can also control discovery
excesses. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A) (requiring federal judges to impose a deadline to "complete
discovery" in most civil cases); FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(2) (listing case-management powers of federal
judges, including many designed to streamline the discovery process).
15. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), (a)(2).
16. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435, 455 (1994) (arguing for a modified version of a requester-pays rule); Martin H.
Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and Modern
Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 778 (2011) (arguing that "[b]ecause the costs
incidental to discovery production are, morally and economically, properly attributable to the
requesting party," the requesting party should pay for its discovery); cf. Martin H. Redish,
Discovery Cost Allocation, Due Process, and the Constitution's Role in Civil Litigation, 71 VAND. L.
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survive a motion to dismiss to pay the defendant's costs of discovery.17
So far, there is less appetite for even broader default rules: for instance,
a rule eliminating all discovery (on the theory that discovery's global
costs outweigh its benefits)18 or a rule allowing discovery to proceed
without regulation (on the theory that discovery's global benefits
outweigh its costs).
This Article recommends a different default approach---one
grounded in history and economics. The basic idea is this: If the parties
forego discovery, they can proceed directly to trial without trial-
stopping filters such as a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment.19 If both parties wish to conduct discovery, they forego the
right to jury trial, instead submitting the case to the judge, who (freed
of the unique requirements of the all-issues jury trial) can manage the
discovery and resolution processes through a "discontinuous trial,"20
which avoids excessive or abusive discovery. This approach contains a
substantial nod in the direction of the historical division between law,
which had trial but no discovery, and equity, which had discovery but
no trial.21 But it works in a manner that avoids the difficulties that
infested traditional systems of law and equity.
This proposal has additional features (including a limited
requester-pays system) and limits that the Article develops over the
course of the three subsequent Parts. Part I sets the table by describing
the rise of the present discovery system and its criticisms. Part II lays
out the proposal in more detail and justifies it. Part III responds to
criticisms, adding final refinements in the process.
REV. 1847 (2018) (expanding on prior arguments that a responder-pays regime for discovery cost
allocation may violate equal protection and due process norms).
17. See Cameron T. Norris, One-Way Fee Shifting After Summary Judgment, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 2117 (2018).
18. Cf. Richard E. Moot, Consider Doing No Discovery, LITIG., Fall 1988, at 36, 58 ("Discovery
is a tool at the disposal of litigators. Like any tool, it is not always useful."); George Shepherd,
Failed Experiment: Twombly, Iqbal, and Why Broad Pretrial Discovery Should Be Further
Eliminated, 49 IND. L. REV. 465, 466 (2016) ("Broad discovery should be eliminated. It is a seventy-
year experiment that has failed. The rest of the world recognizes this. . . ."). But see David
Rosenberg et al., A Plan for Reforming Federal Pleading, Discovery, and Pretrial Merits Review,
71 VAND. L. REV. 2059 (2018) (developing a system to replace discovery with stronger pleading and
mandatory-disclosure rules).
19. Opting out of discovery does not preclude parties from gathering information by other
means. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
20. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE
L.J. 522, 529 (2012) ("In jury-free Continental legal systems, based on the Roman-canon tradition,
civil proceedings are discontinuous, taking place across as many hearings as the court, staffed
exclusively with professional judges, thinks necessary. At these hearings the court hears testimony
and the submissions of the parties' lawyers." (footnote omitted)).
21. This assertion is a bit of an oversimplification. See infra notes 22-25, 132-135 and
accompanying text.
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I. DISCOVERY TODAY
Although discovery was unknown at common law, it has been a
feature of suits in equity, first in England and then in the United States,
for more than six hundred years.22 Common law litigants could
sometimes file a bill in equity to obtain discovery in aid of a common
law action, but the practice was not common, and the allowable
discovery was limited.23 By the middle of the nineteenth century,
discovery began to spread to common law actions in both England and
some state courts in the United States.24 Federal courts lagged behind;
not until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect in 1938
was discovery a feature of every federal case.25
In the years before adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, discovery was never the central feature of civil
litigation that it has now become.26 A number of reasons account for
discovery's more modest role. First, the mine-run of litigation fell within
the jurisdiction of the common law courts. Second, discovery was not
designed to gather the information relevant to a dispute as a prequel to
adjudication; rather, discovery was a part of the adjudication process.
Unlike the common law, which resolved factual disputes by means of
live testimony before a jury, the chancellor resolved suits by means of
documents and a written record.27 Thus, discovery produced the record
for decision. The chancellor determined the order in which issues were
to be decided, the information necessary to decide those issues, and the
22. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 432-44 (1836)
(describing the jurisdiction of equity courts to compel discovery); Alan K. Goldstein, A Short
History of Discovery, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 257, 257 (1981) (noting that discovery was a part of
chancery practice in the fourteenth century); Goldstein, supra, at 266 ("[D]iscovery in England,
and America, was a creature of the courts of equity; the common law did not share it.").
23. See Patricia I. McMahon, Rediscovering the Equitable Origins of Discovery: The
"Blending" of Law and Equity Prior to Fusion, in EQUITY AND LAW: FUSION AND FISSION (John C.P.
Goldberg et al. eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 6-13) (on file with author) (describing the limits
imposed on discovery in equity suits and in aid of common law actions).
24. See Common Law Procedure Act 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, §§ 46-58 (Eng.) (authorizing
common law courts to conduct discovery); Kellen Funk, Equity Without Chancery: The Fusion of
Law and Equity in the Field Code of Civil Procedure, New York 1846-76, 36 J. LEGAL HIST. 152,
174-79 (2015) (describing the breadth of discovery in New York both before and after the adoption
of the Field Code in 1848); Goldstein, supra note 22, at 266 (stating that Connecticut and New
York permitted common law discovery by 1848 and that England permitted it in 1854); Edson R.
Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 869-72 (1933)
(describing the extent of discovery in U.S. and Canadian jurisdictions prior to adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. 645, 694-713.
26. See Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2203 (1989) ("In the run of significant lawsuits, federal discovery
has helped shift the center of gravity from the trial to the pretrial stages.").
27. See McMahon, supra note 23 (manuscript at 1) (noting that discovery was "paper-based").
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forms of discovery to obtain this information.28 The scope and forms of
discovery lay within the chancellor's sound discretion.29 Freed of the
demands of the common law trial, the chancellor could limit discovery
to the information deemed essential to resolving the dispute.30
Third, and relatedly, discovery "allow[ed] one party to examine
documents within the possession of the other with the goal of helping
the [requesting party's] case."3 1 Broad discovery of the "fishing
expedition" variety-discovery intended to allow a requesting party to
learn more about the facts of the dispute and the nature of the
opponent's case in order to shape a party's own theories at trial-was
forbidden.32
During the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
however, discovery expanded as judges both in equity and at common
law granted discovery into the facts relevant to the dispute.33 The 1938
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were strongly committed to this
approach, giving parties a broad ability to access all forms of discovery
in every case.34 With depositions, witnesses could be examined
regarding "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action."35 With documents, a court could
order production on a showing of "good cause" as long as the documents
28. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 259 ("The evolution of disclosure from its beginnings in
chancery as a means to present evidence, to its modern discovery functions transpired over several
centuries eventually producing discovery mechanisms significantly different from chancery
procedure.").
29. See McMahon, supra note 23 (manuscript at 6-22) (describing the discretion inherent in
equitable and common law discovery in England from 1850 until roughly 1880).
30. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 259 (noting that discovery in equity was unlike modern
discovery because "modern discovery is designed primarily to provide substantially in advance of
trial[ ] information to the litigants with which they can structure and plot their cases, [while]
chancery procedure was intended not so much to inform the parties as to inform the
decisionmaker").
31. McMahon, supra note 23 (manuscript at 2); accord Sunderland, supra note 24, at 866
(stating that discovery in equity "was discovery of evidence which the pleader wished to obtain in
support of his own case, not discovery regarding the case which his opponent might put up against
him").
32. McMahon, supra note 23 (manuscript at 2).
33. See id. (manuscript at 23) ("Gradually, however, the court began to permit discovery to
unearth the 'truth' about a dispute in the name of 'justice.' "); Sunderland, supra note 24, at 869
('The ancient restrictions upon discovery have met with much criticism in modern times....
Efforts to modernize discovery have been directed along two lines, namely, enlarging its scope and
improving its mechanics.").
34. See Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58
MICH. L. REV. 6, 11 (1959) (noting that the discovery rules adopted in 1938 "had no counterpart at
the time" and that although "there [was] to be found here and there a suggestion for some part of
the proposed system, . . . nowhere [was there] the fusion of the whole to make a complete system
such as" the 1938 rules).
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. 645, 694.
1808
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were "not privileged" and "constitute[d] or contain[ed] evidence
material to any matter involved in the action."36
In 1970, with the removal of judicial approval for document
production, discovery became entirely a party-controlled process.37
Almost immediately, complaints about discovery cost and abuse began
to percolate.38 Those complaints have, in turn, generated important
restrictions on discovery-a process that commenced in 1983 and
remains ongoing39-as well as satellite changes in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or their interpretation that have the effect of tamping
down discovery.40
These changes have done little to push discovery from its central
spot in U.S. litigation. A constant refrain in the literature on the U.S.
civil justice system is the "vanishing trial": 41 in the last fiscal year, only
0.9 percent of federal civil cases reached trial.42 Perhaps three percent
of federal civil cases are dismissed in whole or part on a Rule 12 motion
to dismiss.43 The vast bulk of the remaining civil cases (or remaining
claims, in the case of a partial dismissal) end on a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment or with a settlement.44 Settlement or summary
36. See FED. R. CIv. P. 34 (1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. 645, 707-08.
37. See Richard Marcus, 'Looking Backward" to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1708 (2014)
(describing the 1970 discovery amendments as "the high water point for discovery liberality").
38. Perhaps the most famous marker of the rising dissatisfaction with discovery was the 1976
Pound Conference. For a description of the proceedings of the conference, see THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds.,
1979). See also Lara Traum & Brian Farkas, The History and Legacy of the Pound Conferences, 18
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 677, 685-88 (2017). But such concern with discovery was hardly
new. For instance, Patricia McMahon has explored instances in which British courts in the
nineteenth century sought to prevent vexatious or oppressive discovery. See McMahon, supra note
23 (manuscript at 21-22).
39. For a discussion of these changes, see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text and infra
notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of these changes, see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
41. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). For a critical appraisal of the
decline in trials, see Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials
on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286 (2013).
See also infra notes 154-156 and accompanying text.
42. See Judicial Business 2017 Table C-4-U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Terminated, by
Nature of Suit and Action Taken, U.S. CTS. 1 (Sept. 30, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/datatables/jbc4.0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW8M-YS6K] [hereinafter
Judicial Business].
43. Exact figures on the grant rates for motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for
summary judgment are uncertain, but motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim immediately
terminate claims in perhaps two to three percent of cases. See CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMIss,
supra note 11, at 8, 14 tbl.4 (reporting that Rule 12(b)(6) motions were filed in 6.2 percent of cases
in a 2009-10 study, with 39.7 percent of these motions terminating some or all claims without
permitting leave to amend).
44. Unfortunately, available data do not indicate how common summary judgment is in
relation to settlement. The available evidence suggests that summary judgment is granted in ten
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judgment typically occurs only after an extended period of discovery.45
In cases involving discovery, discovery expenses account for nearly half
of all litigation expenses,46 and substantial fees and expenses are also
incurred as lawyers use information gleaned from discovery to write
briefs applying the law to the facts.47
One of the reasons that discovery occupies this critical position
is the scope of discoverable material. As a prima facie matter, any
evidence that is relevant is discoverable48-and "relevance" has a
capacious meaning.49 The limits of privilege, proportionality, and work
percent or less of all federal civil cases, meaning that somewhere in the neighborhood of sixty to
seventy percent of cases settle. See Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment
Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 882-86, 896 (2007)
(noting that summary judgment successfully terminated 7.8 percent of cases in studied federal
districts); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates over Time, Across
Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts, in
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 2008, at 1, 25 (Kuo-Chang Huang ed., 2009) (finding
that summary judgment disposed of between 5 and 10.9 percent in sample from two federal
districts). On settlement, credible estimates suggest that around two-thirds of all cases settle,
although some scholars suggest a higher figure, and the rate of settlement can hinge on exactly
how the term "settlement" is defined. Compare Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 136 (2002) (estimating a settlement rate to be at
least 66.7 percent in federal civil cases terminated in 2000), and Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte
Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111,
132 (2009) (finding an aggregate settlement rate of 66.9 percent of civil cases in two federal district
courts), with STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 281 n.1 (2004)
(citing studies showing that over ninety-six percent of civil cases were settled without trial).
45. Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating that summary judgment is
available "after adequate time for discovery").
46. See Willging et al., supra note 4, at 548 (reporting that for both plaintiff and defense
lawyers, the mean percentage of discovery expenses in relation to all expenses was forty-seven
percent, while the median was fifty percent).
47. See Jordan M. Singer, Gossiping About Judges, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 473 (2015)
("The current generation of young attorneys is increasingly comfortable with defining themselves
as 'litigators' rather than 'trial lawyers'-with relative expertise in handling written briefing,
discovery, and settlement, and relative non-expertise in oral argument, evidentiary objections, and
trial techniques.").
48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (permitting parties to "obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs
of the case").
49. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (stating that evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and "the fact is of consequence
in determining the action"). The Federal Rules of Evidence generally guide the trial process, not
the pretrial process, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain no comparable definition of
relevance. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has observed that the meaning of relevance in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) should be "construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears
on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in
the case." Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). Some courts have read
Oppenheimer to suggest that relevance is "a broader concept in the context of discovery compared
to evidentiary relevancy." Price v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 746 F. Supp. 2d 860, 866 (E.D.
Mich. 2010).
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product temper the breadth of discovery at the margins,5 0 but lawyers
can use the discovery process to cast nets that yield large quantities of
information.
Broad discovery has important benefits. Principally, it ensures
a rational and accurate process for adjudicating or settling claims. In a
common law system without discovery, outcome-affecting information
can be hidden from the opponent and the fact finder.51 Without
discovery, the outcome of a case may become overly dependent on the
quality of the lawyers; the theatrics of examination and cross-
examination loom larger when the facts that might prick the balloon of
a particular line of testimony are unknown.5 2 Moreover, to the extent
that a meaningful "day in court" is a goal of our adjudicatory system,53
discovery gathers the information that helps to ensure that parties can
present their strongest factual cases.
Even discovery's most pernicious side effect-cost-can also be
spun as a positive feature. For instance, because many people with valid
claims do not sue and therefore do not force defendants to internalize
the full costs of their wrong, the threat of discovery costs incurred in the
subset of lawsuits that would be filed can create a useful deterrent to
defendants' wrongdoing.54 Moreover, a more expensive lawsuit
establishes a wider range within which a case might settle and
therefore increases the likelihood of settlement.5 5 To the extent that
50. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) bars discovery of privileged material. See also
FED. R. EVID. 1101(c) (applying the federal rules regarding privilege to pretrial proceedings). Rules
26(b)(1)-(2) contain the proportionality limit. Rules 26(b)(3)-(4) define the work-product
protection available for ordinary and expert work product.
51. See Sunderland, supra note 24, at 869 ("[I]nformation regarding the course which can or
will be taken by one's adversary is an almost universal necessity if the merits of the case are to be
fully presented, if preparation is to be facilitated, and if the trial is not to be confused and
encumbered with useless matters.").
52. Cf. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823,
843 (1985) ("The simple truth is that very little in our adversary system is designed to match
combatants of comparable prowess, even though adversarial prowess is a main factor affecting the
outcome of litigation.").
53. Compare Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process,
and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1877, 1877 (2009) ("The notion that the individual litigant possesses a foundational
constitutional right to his day in court before his rights may be judicially altered has long served
as a guide for the shaping of modern procedure."), with Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in
Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 288 (1992) ("The assumption basic
to the conventional account of the day in court ideal-that each person has an individual right to
control her own lawsuit-is wrong on positive and normative grounds.").
54. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.2 (8th ed. 2011) (describing
how legal errors can increase the number of claims and the expense of the legal system).
55. See id. § 21.6 (discussing how procedural rules such as discovery can affect the decision
to settle); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative
Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 57 (1982) (discussing how risk-
neutral parties make decisions about filing or maintaining a lawsuit based on expected value,
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settlement rather than adjudication of disputes is socially desirable-
and the point is hotly contested56-discovery may enhance social utility.
For the most part, however, discovery's cost and intrusiveness
are seen in a negative light. Without question, the process imposes costs
across the board. The party responding to a request for discovery must
engage in a time-consuming and expensive process to find responsive
information and sift out the subset that privilege, proportionality, or
work product protect from disclosure.57 Next, the party requesting the
discovery must spend time and money digesting the responsive
information. The costs to both sides must be incurred even though the
fraction of discovery that matters to the resolution of a case is likely to
be small.58
The concern for discovery's negative effects is especially acute in
cases of informational asymmetry: in other words, cases in which one
side (often a large corporate defendant) holds significantly more
discoverable information than the other side (often an injured plaintiff).
If both sides possess roughly equal quantities of information, the costs
of discovery wash out and do not significantly affect the equilibrium
point for settlement.59 Furthermore, in a situation of symmetrical
"discounting possible outcomes by their probabilities" and the costs involved in litigation); cf LEE
& WILLGING, supra note 5, at 33 fig. 19 (reporting data that approximately half of attorneys
believed that discovery had no effect on settlement, while approximately twenty-five percent
believed that discovery costs increased or greatly increased the likelihood of settlement).
56. For the classic argument that settlement is not socially desirable in many cases, see Owen
M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984), which argues that cases often have
implications for society as a whole, and thus their full adjudication may be necessary to achieve
justice. For contrary positions more sympathetic to settlement, see Andrew W. McThenia &
Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 (1985), which argues, "Many
advocates of [Alternative Dispute Resolution] . . . assume not that justice is something people get
from the government but that it is something people give to one another"; and Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in
Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2692 (1995), which argues that Alternative Dispute Resolution
can be more flexible in meeting the parties' goals and in achieving fairer, more ethical, and more
democratic adjustments of competing interests. See also Symposium, Against Settlement: Twenty-
Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117 (2009) (engaging Professor Fiss's argument from a
range of perspectives).
57. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting
that the costs of restoring and searching electronically stored information was $165,955, while the
cost of reviewing and screening them added another $107,695 to the production cost).
58. See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES
3 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/itigation-cost_survey of major-companies
0.pdf [https://perma.cclN2GM-UV5W] (noting that an average of "4,980,441 pages of documents
were produced in discovery in major cases that went to trial-but only 4,772 exhibit pages actually
were marked").
59. For instance, assume a case in which the plaintiff has a fifty-percent chance of winning
$100,000. In a world without litigation costs, and assuming that both parties are rational, risk-
neutral actors who value the case similarly, the settlement value of the case is $50,000. Now, if
the litigation costs for each party (exclusive of discovery) amount to $20,000, and the costs of
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information, a kind of mutual-assured destruction keeps both parties
on the discovery straight and narrow: one party's abuse of the discovery
process would likely trigger the other party to respond in kind.60 When
information is asymmetrically held, however, the median point for
settlement skews to the advantage of the party with less information.61
And the party with more information has no easy means to keep the
party with less information from imposing significant, nonreciprocal
discovery expenses on it.
Tied closely to, but distinct from, the problem of asymmetry is
the fear of discovery abuse. A party with allegations sufficient to clear
the motion to dismiss hurdle obtains access to reams of an opponent's
information, much of which is ordinarily kept out of public view.62
Beyond privacy concerns are, once again, concerns about cost-in
particular, costs of responding to discovery requests that a poorly
financed responding party may be unable to bear. Using discovery as a
weapon to browbeat an opponent into submission rather than for its
stated purpose of obtaining information can be a large component of a
"scorched earth" litigation strategy.63
As a result of these concerns, much of the energy in U.S.
procedural reform for the past thirty-five years has been directed
toward solving the cost problem in discovery. Some approaches have
tackled cost issues by constraining the expansiveness of discovery. In
discovery are symmetrical at $10,000 apiece, the settlement range for the case is $20,000 to
$80,000, with the midpoint still being $50,000.
60. See John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear
Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 615-16 (1989) (using game theory and the
concept of nuclear deterrence to analyze "the effect that asymmetries in the availability of
resources and opportunities for discovery have on the potential for discovery abuse").
61. For instance, assume the case described supra note 59, but with asymmetrical costs of
discovery for the plaintiff of $5,000 and for the defendant of $35,000. If the litigation costs for each
party (exclusive of discovery) are $20,000, the settlement range for the case is $25,000 to $105,000,
with the midpoint skewing upward from a no-discovery median of $50,000 to a with-discovery
median of $65,000.
62. A party can throw a cloak over some trade secrets or other private information by means
of a protective order. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.432 (2004) [hereinafter
MANUAL] (describing the pros and cons of umbrella protective orders). But there is no guarantee
that this shield will remain in place throughout or after the litigation. See, e.g., In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming trial court's order, entered at the
behest of a public-interest organization, to unseal discovery materials previously designated as
confidential under a protective order).
63. See Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 718 (N.D. Ill. 2014):
Where a defendant enjoys substantial economic superiority, it can, if it chooses, embark
on a scorched earth policy and overwhelm its opponent. ... But even where a case is
not conducted with an ulterior purpose, the costs inherent in major litigation can be
crippling, and a plaintiff, lacking the resources to sustain a long fight, may be forced to
abandon the case or settle on distinctly disadvantageous terms.
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addition to limiting the scope of discovery,64 the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure now presumptively cap certain forms of discovery,65 require
parties to certify that discovery is not being requested for an improper
purpose,66 presumptively ban the disclosure of inaccessible
electronically stored information,67 and demand that all discovery be
proportional to the needs of the case.68 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have also deployed indirect approaches to cut down on the
amount of discovery: for instance, providing for more discovery
planning,69 trying to tamp down the filing of low-merit claims,70
requiring the mandatory disclosure of certain discoverable
information,71 and, above all, increasing the case-management powers
of judges.72
In theory, the most effective of these measures is
proportionality, which first came into the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1983 and has lived a peripatetic existence ever since.73 The
64. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(A) (permitting courts by local rule or order to limit requests
for admission); FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i), (d)(1) (presumptively limiting depositions to ten per
side, with no deposition lasting more than one day of seven hours); FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1) (limiting
interrogatories to twenty-five per party).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(ii).
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). Such information can still be obtained if the requesting party
demonstrates "good cause." Id.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), (b)(2), (g)(1)(B)(iii).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
70. This approach has two prongs: rulemaking and judicial interpretation. On the
rulemaking front, Rule 11 imposes sanctions for frivolous factual and legal assertions made in
pleadings, motions, and other nondiscovery filings; the goal of preventing frivolous assertions also
has as an intended indirect effect the prevention of the costly discovery necessary to disprove those
assertions. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (describing the evolution of Rule 11 since
1983). On the judicial front, the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rules 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) to
require the dismissal of claims founded on implausible allegations was also crafted with an eye
toward curtailing expensive discovery. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the
evolution of plausibility pleading).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
72. The court's case-management authority is located in Rule 16, which has been bulked up
in a series of reforms, principally in 1983 and 1993. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's
note to 1983 amendment (describing the addition of a mandatory scheduling order and expanding
the list of subjects for consideration at a case-management conference); FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory
committee's note to 1993 amendment (describing the addition and clarification of subjects to be
included in the scheduling order or considered at a case-management conference).
73. Proportionality began as a two-sentence add-on to Rule 26 in 1983. See FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment. It moved to Rule 26(b)(2) in 1993 before
splitting itself between Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(2) in a 2000 amendment. See id. In 2006, it
expanded its reach with the e-discovery amendment of Rule 26(b)(2)(B). See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)
advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment (noting that a court may compel discovery of not
reasonably accessible electronically stored information if the costs and burdens "can be justified in
the circumstances of the case"). In 2015, reforms that intended to emphasize the importance of
proportionality shifted the bulk of the rule back up to Rule 26(b)(1), with a smaller remainder still
existing in Rule 26(b)(2). See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
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concept of ensuring that discovery's costs match discovery's gains is
eminently sensible. It is also eminently impractical. Judges possess
almost none of the information needed to make informed decisions
about the value of potential discovery to the accurate disposition of a
case.74 Moreover, parties often have private incentives to make (or force
other parties to make) litigation expenditures that diverge from the
socially desirable level of spending.7 5 Limiting discovery to a socially
proportional level is more aspirational than realistic, which explains
the array of other direct and indirect reforms that the federal rules have
assayed76 and commentators have proposed.7 7
Although controlling the negative effects of discovery has proven
difficult, it is worth remembering that these side effects are not a major
problem in every case-and indeed not even in most cases.7 8 Crafting
solutions to deal with a cost-and-abuse problem in a minority of cases
risks throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
Against this backdrop fits my own proposal: allow the parties to
elect in to (or out of) the discovery system. The proposal uses a
combination of incentives that tailor the "discovery/no- discovery"
duality of equity and the common law to modern circumstances in a way
that harnesses the potential of a number of other reforms, such as
mandatory disclosure and case management.
II. THE PROPOSAL
The gist of my proposal is to empower litigants to opt out of the
discovery system in return for certain benefits and to impose certain
consequences if they do not. Under the proposal, parties can mutually
opt out of discovery; in lieu of discovery, parties mandatorily disclose
the witnesses and documents they intend to use at trial. Opting out of
discovery carries certain benefits. The parties proceed directly to trial;
as a rule, no motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment bar
the way.7 9 If the case is jury triable under existing law, the parties
retain the right to a jury. On the other hand, the parties can mutually
agree to participate in discovery. In doing so, the parties sacrifice the
74. For a more detailed explanation of the difficulty of implementing a proportionality test
for discovery, see Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 874-76 (2015).
75. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 577-78 (1997) (arguing that because many
litigants consider only the benefits they garner and the costs they incur, they consider neither the
benefits of the lawsuit that they do not capture nor the costs that their behavior imposes on others).
76. See supra notes 64-66, 69-72 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
79. I discuss limits on this statement infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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right to jury trial. No longer constrained by the requirements of jury
trial, the judge can employ various case-management strategies to
carve up the case in a fashion that limits the scope of discovery and can
determine the case on a motion to dismiss, on a motion for summary
judgment, or at a bench trial. Finally, when the parties disagree about
the need for discovery (say, a plaintiff wants discovery and a defendant
does not), then the party who wishes to engage in discovery may not file
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment against the party who
waives discovery and must also pay the reasonable costs of the
discovery in which the party engages (including the costs of the waiving
party). The party opting out of discovery is entitled to receive
mandatory disclosure from the opponent. Jury-trial rights are
unaffected.
Section II.A fully describes the proposal, which is summarized
in Figure 1. Section II.B justifies the proposal.






















1. No motions to dismiss or for sum- 1. No motions to dismiss or for sum-
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of witnesses and documents that may permitted under the present Federal
be used at trial Rules of Civil Procedure
3. Defendant bears the reasonable 3. Jury trial waived
costs of discovery against plaintiff
4. Jury trial if so triable
OPTING OUT OF DISCOVERY
A. Back to the Future with Discovery
The fundamental point of this proposal is to give both parties an
opportunity to opt out of discovery. At present, every party in every
lawsuit enjoys a right to engage in the full range of discovery. The rules
provide no incentives for parties to refrain from doing so. Although a
party may choose not to engage in discovery when economic self-interest
so dictates and when discovery provides no tactical litigation
advantage, these are rare circumstances. When an opponent employs
discovery-often with the goal of accumulating the information to file a
dispositive motion or to obtain a better negotiating position-it takes a
mighty will not to return fire or, if not, to engage in a preemptive strike.
Given that an opponent can engage in discovery even if a party
does not, the opt-out system must build in certain carrots and sticks.
Those in my proposal are grounded in both historical practice and
economic principles. The proposal creates one carrot to induce parties
to opt out of discovery: freedom from two dispositive motions (the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the motion for
summary judgment), thus funneling a case on the track to trial
(including trial by jury when appropriate). The proposal also creates
three potential sticks for parties who decline to opt out of discovery:
exposure to dispositive pretrial motions, waiver of the jury-trial right
(if both parties decline to opt out of discovery), and a requester-pays
regime (if a party stays in the discovery system but the opponent opts
out).
In working through these carrots and sticks, I begin with a
simple two-party, one-claim case. I then expand the idea to encompass
more complex party and claim structures. I conclude with some
thoughts on the tactics involved in the decision to opt out of discovery
(or not).
1. The Basic System
A plaintiff who files suit must make an election at the time of
filing: to seek (or not seek) discovery from the defendant and nonparties.
If the plaintiff opts out of discovery, the plaintiff's complaint is immune
from dismissal on motion, except in limited circumstances.0 The
defendant must answer the complaint and make a similar election: opt
out of discovery or retain discovery rights. On the other hand, if the
plaintiff does not opt out of discovery, the plaintiff is not immune from
dismissal on a motion to dismiss. If the lawsuit moves beyond the
80. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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motion to dismiss stage (either because the defendant makes no motion
or the plaintiff survives the motion), then the defendant must answer
the complaint and also make an election to stay in or opt out of the
discovery system.81
Thus, four possible scenarios arise: (1) the plaintiff and the
defendant both opt out of discovery; (2) the plaintiff opts out of
discovery, but the defendant stays in the system; (3) the plaintiff stays
in the discovery system, but the defendant opts out; and (4) the plaintiff
and the defendant both choose to conduct discovery.
The following Sections explore the procedural consequences of
each scenario. First, however, an important caveat: opting out of
discovery does not preclude parties from gathering information. They
may interview witnesses, file Freedom of Information Act requests,82
and seek evidence from cooperating persons. By opting out of discovery,
a party loses only one right: the ability to use the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to compel the disgorgement of information in others'
possession in advance of trial.
a. Plaintiff and Defendant Mutually Opt Out of Discovery
Begin with the situation in which both parties opt out of
discovery. In opting out, both parties immunize themselves to
dispositive pretrial motions that go to the merits of their claims and
defenses. The parties remain subject to certain dispositive motions that
are unrelated to the merits-in particular, the motions to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of
venue, defects in process or service of process, or failure to join a
required party.83
81. In the system I describe, the parties make their elections seriatim, beginning with the
plaintiff. The system would also work if both parties made their election simultaneously after the
pleadings close, perhaps at the Rule 26(f) discovery-planning conference.
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1H5), (7). Consistent with, but not required by, this approach
would be a limited motion testing the merits-a motion claiming that the requested relief is legally
or factually impossible. A legally impossible claim or defense is one clearly barred under existing
law; for instance, the facts may show a clear lack of duty, or claim preclusion may bar suit. A
motion to dismiss a legally impossible claim is equivalent to a common law demurrer, with the
exception that if the motion is denied, the case proceeds to a trial on the merits. See, e.g., CHARLES
E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 78, at 501 (2d ed. 1947) ("[T~he general
demurrer raised defects of substance, the failure to state a cause of action."); BENJAMIN J.
SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 28 (3d ed. 1923) (outlining how a demurrer
works within the system of common law pleading). A factually impossible claim or defense is one
of the "little green men" variety. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a complaint should be dismissed due to faulty factual allegations only
when the allegations "are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little
green men, or the plaintiffs recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel").
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Without discovery and with limited motion practice, the case
should be ready for trial quickly. But one lesson from the common law
is the dysfunction of trial by ambush; because neither the parties nor
third persons could be forced to reveal information in advance of trial,
trial became a game of wits in which victory often went to the side that
best managed the surprise and theater of trial.84 To avoid that dynamic,
parties who mutually forego discovery must have some access to the
issues and evidence that they will face. Four mechanisms should be
sufficient to avoid undue surprise while streamlining the pretrial
process.
First, the parties must jointly prepare a trial plan that
identifies and mandatorily discloses several critical matters for trial,
including stipulated factual and legal issues; disputed factual and legal
issues; documents that a party intends to use at trial and objections
that the opposing party raises to those documents; a list of the witnesses
that each party may call at trial and a short summary of their
testimony; and, in the case of expert witnesses, an expert report. In
cases involving damages, a calculation of damages-including all
supporting evidence, such as medical records when a person's physical
or mental health is in controversy as well as any insurance
agreements-also falls within a mandatory-disclosure requirement.
Except for summaries of a lay witness's testimony, most of these
disclosures are already mandated either in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or in judges' final pretrial orders.85 Summaries or narratives
Providing a motion to dismiss based on impossibility is debatable. On the one hand, little is
gained from the trial of impossible claims or defenses. On the other hand, providing such a motion
creates a danger that the bar will be lowered over time, wiping out the principal carrot that induces
parties to opt out. Even without an impossibility motion, a court can address impossible claims on
a motion for judgment as a matter of law during trial. See FED. R. CIv. P. 50(a)(1) (enabling a judge
to enter judgment during a jury trial when the evidence is insufficient to find in favor of the party
opposing the motion). Indeed, Charles Clark, who was the principal architect of the federal rules'
pleading regime, reportedly would have "preferred to dispense with the motion to dismiss
altogether." Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal Rules: Exploring the
Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 857 n.47 (2012). He believed "that a
plaintiff with a compelling story should be able to bring it before a judge and ask for justice." Emily
Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 How. L.J. 73, 84
(2008).
84. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) ("Modern
instruments of discovery serve a useful purpose.... They together with pretrial procedures make
a trial less a game of blind man's buff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts
disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV.
940, 946-47 (1961) (describing the common law regime in which "[e]ach party found preparation
for trial something of a gamble which required him to anticipate his adversary's strategy largely
by guesswork").
85. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(e) (permitting a court to hold "a final pretrial conference to
formulate a trial plan, including a plan to facilitate the admission of evidence"); FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a) (mandating the disclosure of documents, witnesses, expert reports, and other information);
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of lay testimony are also not novel; they are a well-known case-
management echnique in complex cases.8 6
Second, the parties must be allowed to subpoena for trial
documents in the possession of their opponents or third parties. This
subpoena authority comes with limits. The requesting party must pay
the reasonable cost of production.87 The request must identify specific
documents that the requesting party intends to use to prove an element
of the party's case.88 Production need not occur until shortly before the
parties' trial plan is due. These requirements should tamp down
production of the "fishing expedition" variety.
Third, parties can agree to conduct discovery.89 This discovery
would be limited to the terms of the agreement. The bargaining would
allow the parties to negotiate to extract concessions or other matters of
value from the discovery process, thus creating a minimarket in
discovery rights.90
Fourth, discovery to preserve evidence that would be lost by the
time of trial should be permitted.91
Saverson v. Levitt, 162 F.R.D. 407 (D.D.C. 1995) (ordering use of narrative direct testimony and
citing cases); Fed. Judicial Ctr., Form 36: Final Pretrial Order, Civ. LITIG. MGMT. MANUAL (2d ed.
2010), https://www.fc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CivLit
2 DForm36.pdf [https://perma.cc/77QJ-
A5ZR] (sample final pretrial order); Fed. Judicial Ctr., Form 39: Final Pretrial Order, CIV. LITIG.
MGMT. MANUAL (2d ed. 2010), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CivLit2DForm
3 9 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/CUH9-WM5A] (another sample pretrial order). Under the federal rules, parties
are also required to disclose certain other information, including a computation of damages with
supporting documentation and any applicable insurance agreements. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv).
86. See MANUAL, supra note 62, §§ 12.331, 12.51 (recommending the use of summaries of
deposition testimony as well as narrative statements of witnesses in nonjury cases); see also
Oostendorp v. Khanna, 937 F.2d 1177, 1178-80 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming an order requiring five-
page summaries of deposition testimony); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 83 F.R.D. 323, 339-
41 (D.D.C. 1979) (discussing the use of narrative summaries for direct examinations).
87. Shifting the cost of production to the requesting party is necessary to force the requesting
party to internalize the costs of discovery and thus to prevent excessive use of nonparty discovery.
The court may also need to control nonparty discovery to prevent a party who claims to opt out of
discovery from effectively doing an end run around the opt-out decision and tactically declining to
join a potential codefendant o obtain nonparty discovery from the second putative defendant. This
tactical choice is not necessarily problematic, because the opt-out system thus simplifies a two-
defendant suit into a one-defendant suit. Should the plaintiff sue the nonparty in later litigation,
however, the plaintiff should be deemed to have opted in to discovery due to the discovery
conducted in the prior suit.
88. In this sense, discovery would return somewhat to its early roots. See supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
89. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 29(b) (permitting the parties to modify the procedures "governing or
limiting discovery").
90. Cf. Ronen Avraham et al., Procedural Flexibility in Three Dimensions 25-31 (Univ. of
Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 843, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3140585 [https://perma.cc/3CDK-G49G] (describing the benefits of
creating secondary markets to trade procedural rights).
91. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 27 (permitting prefiling depositions to perpetuate testimony).
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At trial, the parties retain whatever jury-trial rights they
otherwise possess.92 The prospect of proceeding directly to trial raises
one concern. At present, some cases involving little to no discovery do
not generally proceed to trial. For instance, Social Security appeals93
and habeas corpus petitions94 are typically disposed of on motion.
Likewise, cases involving an uncontested debt on a student loan, a
mortgage, or a commercial note often require no trial.95 Thus,
categorical exceptions that keep a party from using the discovery opt-
out as a tactical tool to obtain a trial that is not generally available may
be advisable.
When both parties opt out of discovery, the process, in many
ways, mimics the modern arbitration system, in which parties, by prior
agreement, typically forego most discovery rights.96 In one sense, an
opt-out process is broader than arbitration because the parties can
consent to pretermit discovery even in cases in which parties had no
predispute agreement to arbitrate. In other ways, the opt-out system
effects a more limited change in legal rights than arbitration because
the parties retain their jury-trial rights. But providing an arbitration-
92. In federal court, the Seventh Amendment is the principal determinant of the scope of
parties' jury-trial rights in civil cases. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (providing in part that "[iln
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved"). Congress may also authorize jury trial for a statutory right of action.
9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302.2, at
54 (3d ed. 2008). Parties may, however, waive their right to jury trial by failing to demand it. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d) ("A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly served and filed.").
93. See Robert J. Axelrod, Comment, The Politics of Nonacquiescence: The Legacy of
Stieberger v. Sullivan, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 765, 794 n. 151 (1994) (noting the "summary disposition
of many Social Security appeals in district courts").
94. See Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result, 69 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 85, 123 (2012) (stating that "the circumstances in which habeas discovery or an
evidentiary hearing is available seem perilously narrow").
95. Actions on a debt were the type of cases for which summary judgment was originally
created in England. See Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67
(Eng.).
96. In arbitration, discovery is unavailable or limited unless the parties otherwise agree. See
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (upholding an agreement to
arbitrate ADEA disputes even though discovery in the arbitration proceeding was limited); Joseph
L. Daly & Suzanne M. Scheller, Strengthening Arbitration by Facing Its Challenges, 28
QuINNIPIAc L. REV. 67, 96 (2009) ("Parties may expand or limit pre-arbitration discovery by
agreement."); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1865, 1930 n.320 (2015) (noting that 7.6 percent of arbitration agreements authorize
discovery). The court can enforce the parties' agreement o conduct discovery but has little to no
power to order discovery beyond the parties' agreement. Cf. Oriental Commercial & Shipping Co.
v. Rosseel, N.V., 125 F.R.D. 398, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (indicating that courts will permit discovery
when a movant demonstrates "extraordinary circumstances" and that discovery will "aid"
arbitration (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1973))).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
like option is an important step if the litigation system is to remain
competitive and relevant in the modern market of dispute resolution.
97
b. Plaintiff Opts Out of Discovery, Defendant Opts In
The second scenario involves a plaintiff who opts out of
discovery but a defendant who decides not to do so. The defendant's
decision to stay in the discovery system may be reflexive, opposing
anything that the plaintiff supports. Or, as can be true in some Goliath-
versus-David lawsuits, the plaintiff may have most of the discoverable
information in its possession. In either instance, the defendant will opt
for discovery.
Because the defendant can wield a tactical weapon (discovery)
that the plaintiff cannot, certain protections are in order. First, the
defendant cannot file dispositive pretrial motions on the merits against
the plaintiff.98 As with the prior scenario, the reason is simple: without
the power to discover evidence that the defendant possesses, a plaintiff
has less ability to fend off such motions and should not be expected to
do so.99 This reasoning does not extend to the defendant, whose election
to use discovery empowers the plaintiff to test the defendant's defenses
through a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a motion to strike, or
a motion for summary judgment.100 Second, the defendant must bear
the full cost of any discovery that it seeks, including the reasonable
costs to the plaintiff of responding to the discovery request. Again, the
reason is simple: if the plaintiff has elected not to participate in
discovery, the plaintiff should not be expected to bear its costs. Third,
the plaintiff must mandatorily disclose basic case information before
trial.101
97. See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 576-81
(2006) (suggesting a need to blend the procedural forms of litigation and arbitration); cf. Judith
Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597-600 (2005) (describing the decline
of "Due Process Procedure" and the rise of "Contract Procedure").
98. Other dispositive motions would still be available. See supra note 83 and accompanying
text.
99. Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (stating that summary judgment
should be permitted against a plaintiff who bears the burden of proof on an issue only "after
adequate time for discovery").
100. A Rule 12(f) motion to strike is available to eliminate any inadequate defense alleged in
the defendant's answer. See 5C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1381, at 407 (3d ed. 2004) ("[A]n insufficient defense may be stricken on motion
of the plaintiff."). The Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is the plaintiffs equivalent
to the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and may be employed
by the plaintiff when the complaint, answer, and referenced exhibits demonstrate that the
defendant cannot plausibly win the case. See id. § 1367.
101. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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As a final protection, the court might extend to a plaintiff that
has opted out of discovery one opportunity to step back in to the
discovery system if it becomes apparent that a defendant is pursuing a
strategy that the plaintiff can parry only with discovery. If the plaintiff
exercises this option, the case continues under the procedures for cases
in which both parties choose to employ discovery, discussed shortly.102
In this second scenario, the trial rights of the parties are
unaffected; by opting out of discovery, the plaintiff can be deemed to
have demanded a jury trial if one is otherwise available. The other
limitations previously discussed-for instance, permitting the plaintiff
to subpoena documents if the plaintiff bears the costs of production-
still apply to the plaintiff. 103 In addition, the court possesses the full
range of controls on discovery in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-
including proportionality and various case-management techniques-
to limit the defendant's discovery. Mindful of the plaintiffs decision not
to conduct discovery, the court may choose to exercise these controls
with some vigor.
c. Plaintiff Opts In to Discovery, Defendant Opts Out
The third situation is the converse of the second: here the
plaintiff elects to conduct discovery, but the defendant does not. The
plaintiffs election carries certain consequences. The plaintiffs
complaint is now subject to dispositive motions on the merits (especially
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment). On the other hand, the
plaintiff cannot employ any motions to obtain judgment on the merits
of the defendant's defenses. The defendant must now disclose
documents intended to be used at trial, provide summaries of testimony
and expert reports for witnesses likely to be called at trial, and identify
stipulated and contested issues in a final pretrial order. 104 The plaintiff
must pay for any discovery that it conducts, including the reasonable
costs of the defendant's production. As with the prior two scenarios, the
jury-trial rights of the parties are unaffected by the defendant's election
to opt out of discovery.
102. See infra Section H.A. 1.d.
103. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. Likewise, the plaintiff must participate in
creating a trial order identifying stipulated and contested issues. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text. As a participant in the discovery process, the defendant must also comply with
the mandatory-disclosure obligations of Rule 26(a).
104. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. By participating in discovery, the plaintiff
is subject to the mandatory-disclosure obligations of Rule 26(a).
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d. Plaintiff and Defendant Mutually Choose to Engage in Discovery
In the final scenario, both the plaintiff and the defendant elect
to not opt out of the discovery system. In doing so, both parties expose
themselves to the usual dispositive pretrial motions that go to the
merits of the case (motions to dismiss, to strike, for judgment on the
pleadings, and for summary judgment). Disclosure and discovery would
proceed under the existing rules. The existing rules also govern
allocation of the costs of discovery: with some exceptions, these rules
require the requesting party to bear the costs of the request and the
responding party to bear the costs of responding.105
Electing to proceed under the current system, however, includes
one critical change: the parties waive any jury-trial rights they possess.
This waiver is a vital component in making the opt-out system work.
When a jury must try a case, the combination of the Reexamination
Clause of the Seventh Amendment06 and the practical difficulty of
either bringing back the same jury or constituting a new jury for
subsequent trials typically requires a court to conduct a continuous, all-
issues trial. An all-issues trial demands that all discovery be conducted
before trial. On the other hand, without a jury, a court can be more
creative in blending pretrial and trial phases. Under this discontinuous-
trial approach, a court can limit discovery to and try a single issue, then
move on to other issues with subsequent discovery and trials if
necessary. For instance, in a mass tort case with a significant issue
regarding whether a chemical can cause the harm alleged, a court can
divide up the case to handle only the causal issue first. If the court finds
105. Under Rule 26, a court can shift the cost of production to the requesting party in some
circumstances. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (permitting a court to "specify conditions for the
discovery" of electronically stored information); FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(E)(i) (requiring a court to
order a requesting party to pay a responding party's expert "a reasonable fee for time spent in
responding to discovery"); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (permitting a court to issue an order
"specifying terms, including ... allocation of expenses," in order to protect a responding party from
undue burden or expense). In general, however, each party bears its own costs in disclosure and
discovery.
106. The Reexamination Clause provides that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
U.S. CONST. amend. VII, cl. 2. Under this Clause, a trial cannot be divided up in such a way that
a second trial would require a second jury to redetermine facts decided by a prior jury from a prior
trial. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498-501 (1931) (permitting a
retrial limited to damages issues when only the jury instructions regarding damages were
erroneous and the damages issues did not require determination of facts also relevant to liability).
Practically, the Clause hinders or prohibits a court from dividing a case into a series of smaller
trials that decide one issue at a time.
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a lack of causation, discovery and trial of other fact-intensive issues,
such as negligence or damages, are avoided.107
A discontinuous-trial approach is common in civil law
systems.0 8 It was also the approach to determine disputes in equity.109
Adapting this method to the modern U.S. system gives the judge the
maximal use of case-management powers-unconstrained by the
demands of jury trial-to limit discovery only to matters essential to
deciding the dispute.
2. Adding Complications: More Claims and Parties
Many disputes involve multiple plaintiffs and defendants, as
well as counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party claims.110 Each new
plaintiff or defendant must enjoy the same rights of election discussed
in the prior Section. The same ability to make a new election arises with
respect to counterclaims, crossclaims, and third-party claims.111 For the
107. For a well-known example of splitting a case into three parts and trying only the issue of
general causation in the first trial, see In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 293-94, 306-17 (6th
Cir. 1988), which affirmed the decision to trifurcate the case, resulting in a defense verdict and
disposing of the claims of more than eight hundred plaintiffs after a twenty-two-day trial. Because
the plaintiffs did not waive their Seventh Amendment rights, the Bendectin case was tried to a
jury. See id. at 306 (stating that the record supported a finding that the plaintiffs timely preserved
their Seventh Amendment objection).
108. For the classic description of the approach used in the German system, see Langbein,
supra note 52, at 826-30. In recent years, some civil law countries have moved in the direction of
a single-trial system for simpler cases as a means to reduce cost. See Richard L. Marcus, E-
Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 674 (2006). Nothing
would prevent a judge in a case in which both parties elected to take discovery from adopting the
continuous-trial method of the adversarial system if that approach was warranted.
109. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1208 (2005):
Once all testimony and documentary evidence was gathered, the parties presented it at
a hearing, after which the judge would either enter a final decree, resolving the dispute,
or an interlocutory decree, ordering further proceedings. Further proceedings might be
necessary to resolve disputed questions of fact and were often referred to a master ....
(footnote omitted).
110. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for these additional claims and parties. See
FED. R. CIv. P. 13 (assertion of counterclaims and crossclaims); FED. R. CIV. P. 14 (assertion of
third-party claims); FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (joining required parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (joining
additional plaintiffs and defendants). In addition, a single plaintiff can assert as many claims as
the plaintiff has, and a single defendant can assert as many defenses as the defendant has. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d); FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
111. As a rule, a court should not permit a new election when a party who has previously made
an election amends a complaint or answer; otherwise, a party could use the liberal amendment
policy of Rule 15 to obtain a tactical advantage. See FED. R. CIv. P. 15(a) (describing generous
terms under which parties are able to amend pleadings). Under exceptional circumstances in
which a party's amendment fundamentally alters the litigation, however, a new election may be
warranted. The opposing party should also enjoy a liberal right to change its original election if
the amendment is granted; otherwise, a party can lock in an opponent's election and then alter the
litigation through amendment.
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most part, this result is dictated by fundamental fairness; some parties
should not (and, with respect to Seventh Amendment rights, cannot)
determine the legal rights of other parties.112
This approach could result in a mixed case: some parties
obtaining discovery on some claims and other parties not obtaining
discovery on other claims. To take a simple example of two plaintiffs
involved in a car accident with one defendant, Plaintiff A and the
defendant may opt out of discovery in Plaintiff A's case, but Plaintiff B
and the defendant may choose to engage in discovery for Plaintiff B's
case. If the defendant's conduct toward both plaintiffs is identical, few,
if any, savings in discovery costs would result. Plaintiffs could also
game the system, with some opting out of discovery and others choosing
discovery as a means of getting a few cases to trial quickly, thus gaining
insight into the defendant's trial strategies and accumulating trial
evidence at low cost.
One adjustment to avoid this tactical ploy is to deny issue-
preclusive effect to the early judgments.113 The tactical use of the opt-
out process also raises larger issues about the ways in which the system
could be used as a weapon to gain advantages, as well as questions
about how frequently parties might opt out of discovery. The following
Section takes up these issues.
3. Strategic Considerations in an Opt-Out System
One important question is whether this system will have any
effect on present behavior-in other words, whether any party has an
incentive to opt out of discovery. The answer is yes. Begin with the
plaintiff, who may choose to opt out in numerous circumstances. As a
skeptic will point out, an evident reason for the plaintiff to opt out is to
avoid dismissal of a case so weak on the merits that it would fail on
112. That rationale does not cover counterclaims, which involve new claims asserted by the
existing defendant against the existing plaintiff. But the character of a counterclaim may be
sufficiently different that the parties should in fairness have an opportunity to elect the best
procedure to determine the counterclaim rather than be bound by the elections made on the
original claim. Moreover, with respect to permissive counterclaims, see FED. R. CIv. P. 13(b), the
inability of the defendant to make a new election might lead the defendant not to assert the
counterclaim but to sue in a separate suit in which a new election could be made. The efficiency
involved in joining permissive counterclaims would thus be lost.
113. The authority to do so exists. The type of issue preclusion typically involved is nonmutual
offensive issue preclusion, in which one plaintiff can avoid the need to prove facts that were
litigated, determined, and essential to a prior judgment. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 326-33 (1979) (recognizing the use of nonmutual offensive issue preclusion in federal
court). But the use of such nonmutual issue preclusion is subject to certain exceptions, including
the situation in which a plaintiff could have joined a prior case but refused to do so. See id. at 329-
30.
[Vol. 71:6:18011826
2018] OPTING OUT OF DISCOVERY 1827
pretrial motion. In this instance, a plaintiff might wish to take his or
her chances with a jury. In other words, the skeptic will argue, the
system encourages the filing of exactly the wrong sort of claims.
Few meritless claims, however, are likely to be filed. One reason
is that other protections against meritless litigation, such as Rule 11,114
remain in place to sanction frivolous pleadings and can be expanded to
create sanctions for the trial of frivolous claims. Another reason derives
from real-options analysis, which suggests that adjudicatory systems
with multiple stages of litigation can induce plaintiffs to make
incremental investments in litigation that are more inefficient than
single-stage systems in which the plaintiff knows at the time of filing
that he or she will incur all of the litigation expenses.115 On this theory,
knowledge that a case will proceed directly to trial will discourage the
filing of frivolous and other negative-value suits. Third, juries are not
proplaintiff,116 and in any event, the judge retains the power under Rule
50(a) or Rule 52(c) to enter judgment as a matter of law against a
plaintiff whose trial proof is inadequate.117
114. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (permitting a judge to sanction a party for the filing of pleadings,
written motions, or other papers that have no adequate basis in fact or law).
115. For a classic description of how multistage adjudication (in which the merits of a case are
subjected to multiple barriers, such as a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment
before trial) can influence a plaintiff to make inefficient investments in litigation, see Joseph A.
Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1293-98 (2006). For further discussion of this point, see infra note 151 and
accompanying text.
116. Studies suggest that juries and judges agree in about eighty percent of cases, with judges
being perhaps slightly more disposed to plaintiffs than juries are in cases of disagreement. See,
e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1134 (1992) (analyzing data showing that "plaintiffs enjoy greater
success before judges than before juries in three major tort categories-product liability (personal
injury), medical malpractice, and motor vehicle" and further noting that plaintiffs enjoy higher
win rates before juries than before judges in Federal Employers' Liability Act and marine law
cases); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1065 (1964) (noting
that judges and juries agreed in seventy-nine percent of personal-injury cases, with neither judges
nor juries being more proplaintiff when they disagreed); see also Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod,
Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29,
48 tbl.13 (1994) (finding that judge-jury agreement drops in complex civil cases to sixty-three
percent, but juries are slightly more prodefendant han judges in both civil and criminal cases in
which disagreement exists); cf. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to
Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 502 (2005) ("Additional research
on the effect of jury deliberation generally is clearly warranted as is additional research specifically
comparing judges with juries making group decisions.").
117. Rule 50(a) permits a judge in a jury-tried case to enter judgment as a matter of law when
no reasonable jury could find for the party opposing the motion; the standard is identical to the
pretrial summary judgment standard of Rule 56(a). See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(c) (permitting
a judge in a bench trial to enter judgment on partial findings during the trial when the judge "finds
against the party on that issue").
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Finally, a standard story line in the critique of U.S. discovery is
that plaintiffs with frivolous claims use the expense of the discovery
process to extort money from defendants.118 Assuming the critique's
accuracy, it seems unlikely that plaintiffs with such frivolous claims
will waive the one weapon that they possess to extract a settlement.
In short, even if an opt-out system induces occasional meritless
litigation, it is far from clear that disposing of such lawsuits with no
discovery and immediate trial is less efficient than disposing of a
lawsuit after extensive discovery and a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs may wish to forego discovery in numerous other
instances. For example, the plaintiff may need little information to
conduct a trial. In simple torts, commercial disputes, and cases like
asbestos litigation-in which prior lawsuits have already uncovered
almost all relevant information-the plaintiff may regard the
opportunity to sidestep dispositive pretrial motions and the promise of
a speedy trial as sufficient compensation for the loss of the ability to
pester the defendant with discovery that would add, at best, marginal
value to the case and would slow down its resolution. In addition,
plaintiffs will almost certainly opt out of discovery in cases of strong
informational asymmetry in which the plaintiff possesses most of the
relevant information.119 Finally, in some cases, the defendant may be
likely to engage in scorched-earth discovery tactics intended to force the
plaintiff to drop the case or settle for a pittance;120 the plaintiff can avoid
these tactics by opting out of discovery.
The issue then shifts to the defendant's incentive to opt out. In
many instances, a defendant is likely to choose discovery. A defendant
may reflexively elect to engage in discovery just because the plaintiff
opted out. Likewise, defense lawyers may wish to string a case along for
as long as possible, either to avoid the risk of loss, to keep money in the
client's pockets as long as possible, or, less honorably, to squeeze as
many fees out of the case as possible. In none of these instances would
the defense lawyer opt out of discovery, even if the defendant had little
to gain from the discovery process itself. Finally, in a case of strong
118. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
119. This decision is especially likely if the plaintiff enjoys a second opportunity to opt in to
discovery in the event that the defendant elects to engage in discovery and the defendant's
litigation strategy requires the plaintiff to engage in discovery. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
120. The classic example of the use of scorched-earth tactics to suppress plaintiffs' claims is
the tobacco litigation. For a short history of this litigation, see Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal
History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 867 (1992), which describes how the
tobacco defendants were "able to wear down the tobacco litigants through a seemingly
inexhaustible expenditure of resources."
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informational asymmetry favoring the plaintiff, the defendant will
almost certainly elect to conduct discovery.
Despite these incentives, the best interests of some defendants
dictate that they will opt out. In some cases, a defendant may be as
eager as a plaintiff who opted out of discovery to resolve a dispute
expeditiously; the litigation may hang like the sword of Damocles over
the defendant's future conduct or its balance sheet. Similarly, in simple
cases such as car accidents or well-trod, repetitive litigation, a cost-
conscious defense counsel may realize that substantial cost savings can
result from opting out of discovery-especially because the defendant
must pay the reasonable cost of all discovery that the defendant
conducts.121 The marginal benefits of information obtained in discovery
may be less than the marginal costs of obtaining the information.
Even if the defendant elects to engage in discovery, however, the
cost shifting that occurs should keep the amount of discovery at a level
that the defendant regards as cost justified. Even though a decision to
opt out of discovery by both parties creates the greatest savings,
significant savings can also result from the unilateral decision of the
plaintiff to exit the discovery system.
The plaintiff will not always have an incentive to opt out of
discovery. For instance, in David-versus-Goliath scenarios, in which the
defendant controls access to most of the information necessary for the
plaintiff to prove the claim, the plaintiff is likely to elect to engage in
discovery. The same may be true in a case of two Goliaths (and no
informational asymmetry): the plaintiff may believe that the defendant
or nonparties possess significant information relevant to the claim and
may want to capture that information to strengthen the case. Likewise,
given lawyers' familiarity with discovery, inertia may also lead some
plaintiffs' counsel to stick with the known. Finally, the plaintiff may
elect to engage in discovery precisely to impose costs and extract a
settlement in a claim of limited merit.
When the plaintiff elects to participate in discovery, the
defendant's calculation becomes interesting. In a David-versus-Goliath
scenario, the defendant has a big incentive to opt out of discovery. That
decision will not save the defendant much in terms of requesting
discovery (by definition, the plaintiff has little information worth
121. In order to gain the benefit of delay without paying the cost of discovery, some defendants
may strategically opt in to discovery when the plaintiffs opt out and subsequently conduct little to
no discovery. In these instances, the judge should employ his or her case-management authority
to keep the case moving along.
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discovering22), but opting out shifts the cost of the plaintiffs requested
discovery to the plaintiff, which should temper the amount of discovery
by the plaintiff. Opting out of discovery also seems a good strategy for
a defendant in a case of suspected impositional discovery: now the
plaintiff, who bears the cost of discovery, loses any credible threat to
impose discovery costs as a means of extracting a blackmail
settlement.123 Finally, the defendant may opt out of discovery to
immunize its defenses to motions to dismiss or for summary judgment,
thus gaining settlement leverage.124
In other cases, the defendant, like the plaintiff, may make the
calculation that discovery is necessary. The defendant may also be
worried about unilaterally giving up a right to discovery that the
plaintiff enjoys. The familiarity with the present discovery system may
lead other lawyers to choose the present discovery route. Finally,
avoiding jury trial, which occurs when both sides elect to engage in
discovery, may appeal to some defendants as a reason not to opt out.
125
In all of these cases, both parties will participate in disclosure and
discovery under the present rules.
If plaintiffs and defendants in most cases involving significant
discovery elect to stay in the present system, a skeptic might argue that
the cost savings from an opt-out system are minimal. But this critique
misses two central points. First, most cases involve no risk of excessive
discovery costs.1 26 By creating incentives for defendants to opt out of
discovery in cases involving asymmetric information-which are the
cases usually singled out as the cause of excessive discovery costS127-
the opt-out system is tailored to limit excessive discovery costs in
exactly the cases in which constraints are most necessary.
Second, by mutually electing to stay in the present disclosure-
and-discovery system, the parties waive their jury-trial rights. As a
122. To the extent that the plaintiff has any information worth discovering, the plaintiffs
mandatory disclosures should unearth most of this information. See supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text (discussing mandatory disclosures).
123. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 16, at 453 ("[A] cost-shifting rule completely
eliminates impositonal abuse.").
124. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 75 (1990) (arguing that summary judgment can drive down the value
of settlements for plaintiffs).
125. Admittedly, the defendant in this situation faces a difficult choice. By opting out, the
defendant shifts the costs of the plaintiffs discovery to the plaintiff, a result that many defendants
would regard as a positive feature. But opting out also subjects the defendant o a jury trial if the
case is so triable, a result that many defendants would regard as a negative feature. How these
two factors balance out in the context of a particular case will have a large influence on the
defendant's election.
126. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 7, 61 and accompanying text.
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result, a judge is released from the fetters of the Reexamination Clause.
The judge can employ a discontinuous-trial approach that forces the
parties to train discovery on discrete issues.128 Handling factual issues
in this seriatim fashion can generate cost savings, especially if the court
can target and resolve a dispositive issue early in the litigation.129
Admittedly, not every case is susceptible to cost savings under the
discontinuous-trial approach.130 When combined with the savings from
cases in which one or both parties opt out of discovery, however, the use
of a discontinuous trial can reduce the overall costs of the present
disclosure-and-discovery system.
Undoubtedly, the calculus to opt in to or out of discovery will
involve case-unique factors other than those that I have described. It is
also true that when put into the hands of adversaries, any rule can be
used to achieve tactical gains that frustrate the purpose of the rule. An
opt-out system for discovery is no different. But the combination of cost
shifting when only one party elects to conduct discovery and the loss of
jury-trial rights when both parties elect to conduct discovery help to
ensure that parties wishing to game the system pay a substantial price
for doing so.
B. Why an Opt-Out System Makes Sense
In describing how the opt-out system works and evaluating some
of its tactical implications, I have laid out basic arguments for this
approach. Here I step back and make two larger, thematic arguments
in support of the opt-out system. The first argument derives from
history, the second from economics.
Historically, discovery was a process used only in equity.13 1 It
was a major part of the means by which the chancellor sitting in equity
received the information on which to base a decision. In contrast, at
common law, the fact finder (the jury) received the information
necessary to decide a case at the trial. Granted, the evidentiary
128. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
129. For instance, the Manual for Complex Litigation recommends the use of sequenced or
bifurcated discovery as a means of breaking a large case into bite-sized segments that might foster
an earlier, less costly resolution. See MANUAL, supra note 62, § 11.422 (describing the availability
and advantages of various discovery controls available to judges).
130. Cf. Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 387, 390-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (refusing
to bifurcate issues because dividing a case into multiple proceedings "necessarily implicates
additional discovery; more pretrial disputes and motion practice; empaneling another jury or
imposing more on the jurors who decide the earlier phase of the litigation; deposing or recalling
some of the same witnesses; and potentially engendering new rounds of trial and post-trial motions
and appeals').
131. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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strictures of the common law limited the information available to juries
and thus made discovery largely unnecessary;132 but the trial was the
place for revealing the evidence, while the pretrial process merely
framed the triable issue.133 Over time, a hybrid process softened the
edges of the division between a common law system without discovery
and an equity system with discovery. In some instances, parties in an
action at law could file a bill in equity to obtain discovery for use in the
common law action.134 And by the 1850s, the English courts of common
law and some U.S. courts enjoyed the power to order discovery
directly.13 5
In equity and in the early days of common law discovery in
England, however, the chancellor or judge could, and typically did, limit
discovery both as to methods and as to scope.136 Discovery was not an
information free-for-all to lay bare all of the facts in a dispute but a
limited process to aid a party in disgorging necessary proof within the
opposing party's control. 137 Toward that end, discovery was designed to
work under the close control of a judicial officer.
A system with both discovery and trial, like the modern U.S.
system, has a belt-and-suspenders quality to it. It pastes a process
(discovery) designed to obtain evidence for a discretionary, nonjury
system of adjudication onto the rigid jury system of the common law. 138
The opt-out proposal hearkens back to a world in which discovery was
principally a part of an equitable adjudicatory process. Parties that opt
out of discovery retain their right to trial, including jury trial if a case
132. For instance, common law courts did not permit the testimony of the parties or of spouses,
and they barred parol evidence on contracts. See 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE §§ 326-430 (3d ed. 1846) (discussing the competency of witnesses); cf. Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical Structure of
Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1070-72 (1992) (describing two hypotheses to explain
common law restrictions on admissible evidence: a jury-control principle and a best-evidence
principle).
133. On the nature of common law pleading and its effort to reduce a case to a single legal or
factual issue, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 67-69 (2d ed. 1979).
134. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
137. See Goldstein, supra note 22, at 259 (noting that the function of discovery was to create a
written record "upon which the chancellor could render a verdict").
138. See Kessler, supra note 109, at 1184 ("[S]ome of the worst abuses of modern litigation-
and in particular, our discovery practice-can be traced to the ill-considered way in which
inquisitorial devices were imported into a common-law-based adversarial framework after 1938.");
McMahon, supra note 23 (manuscript at 23) ("Although discovery was borne of equity, many of the
hallmarks of common law procedure now overwhelm the process in modern civil litigation. Rigidity
has replaced judicial discretion; oral examination has come to dominate, supplanting the use of
written interrogatories."). On the rigidity of the common law system, see THEODORE F.T.
PLUCKNE'Ir, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 177-78 (5th ed. 1956).
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is so triable, just as at common law. Parties who mutually choose to
employ discovery step into an equity-like system in which the case-
management discretion of the trial judge can control the excesses of the
discovery process. The intermediate cases, in which only one party opts
for discovery, are akin to those common law cases in which one party
filed a bill in equity to obtain necessary discovery.139
It is important not to stretch this historical analogy too far or to
view our legal heritage through rose-colored glasses. Maintaining the
dual system of law and equity had significant problems and costs; the
merger of law and equity was long overdue.140 One difficulty was the
jagged, ever-shifting line between the jurisdictions of the two
systems.141 Another was the maintenance of distinct procedural
systems to resolve disputes (or even different issues within a single
dispute).142
Unlike the historical practices of law and equity, the opt-out
proposal does not hinge on any predetermined boundary between cases
meriting discovery and those not deserving discovery. Nor is it
accompanied by the rigors of common law procedure that made the
system harsh and unjust in many cases. Discovery is available to every
party in every case; it lies within each litigant's power to choose
whether to use it or not. Granted, that choice has downwind procedural
consequences that influence the choice-in particular, the form of trial,
the availability of certain motions, and the responsibility for payment
of discovery. In a way not true of the historical division between law
and equity, however, these procedural consequences relate directly to
the benefits and costs of discovery itself.
Although the opt-out proposal taps into the historical
sensibilities of law and equity, its principal justification is modern: the
139. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
140. In England, the systems merged in 1875. See Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875, 38
& 39 Vict. c. 77 (Eng.). In the United States, New York's Field Code accomplished the merger in
1848. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.7 (6th ed. 2011). The federal
courts merged the systems in 1938. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 (1938), reprinted in 308 U.S. 645, 663
("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' ").
141. See Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 48-50 (1980) (describing the difficulty of defining the
limits of law and equity in the late eighteenth century). In England, expansions and contractions
of jurisdiction affected not only the line between law and equity but also the lines among the three
common law courts, each of which also employed somewhat varying procedures. See 1 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194-264 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 7th ed.
1956).
142. See Devlin, supra note 141, at 45-64 (describing the interaction of, and differing
procedures in, common law and equity); id. at 45 ("[T]he differences in the procedures of on the
one hand the Court of Chancery and on the other the three courts of common law were so profound




control of litigation costs. Litigation costs are largely a function of two
variables: the direct expenses of litigation (including the cost of
conducting discovery) and error costs.1 4 3 From an economic viewpoint,
a generally desirable goal is minimizing the sum of these costs.144
Applying this insight to discovery is not a simple matter.
Abolishing discovery reduces the expense of litigation but likely
increases errors (because cases are decided on the basis of less
information). It might also increase the number of lawsuits (because
each suit is less expensive to bring). Conversely, retaining discovery
makes each lawsuit more expensive to maintain but likely cuts down on
errors and suppresses the number of cases filed. Without a clear sense
of the macrocosts of discovery and the macrocosts of litigation errors, it
is impossible to know whether a discovery or no-discovery system is
more efficient. Of course, intermediate approaches, which may be more
beneficial than either extreme, also exist. The opt-out system is such an
approach, and it has strong advantages. It tailors the amount of
discovery to the needs of the case, abetting only the discovery whose
marginal cost is less than the marginal gain from enhanced accuracy.
This approach is, in essence, the proportionality doctrine of Rule
26(b)(1). 145 As we have seen, however, judges possess little knowledge
about the parties' legal theories, the nature of the discoverable
information in the parties' possession, or the ways in which that
information might affect the outcome of the case; as a result, they are
poorly equipped to make the cost-benefit calculations that the
proportionality doctrine demands.146
The opt-out system establishes a default rule that maps onto the
cost-benefit calculus by putting the decision about conducting discovery
in the hands of the parties. The parties are better equipped to determine
the costs and benefits of discovery than the judge.147 A party that
143. See POSNER, supra note 54, § 21.1 (describing the economic goals of procedure).
144. There are three different costs to minimize: the cost of harm, the cost of preventing harm,
and transaction costs such as the cost of litigation. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
AcCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-31 (1970). Although this broad objective does
not necessarily require that litigation costs be kept to their minimum (for instance, the fear of
incurring large litigation costs may induce actors to spend more on preventing harm, thus reducing
the overall cost of accidents), it can be difficult to determine the best way to minimize all three
components. Hence, keeping litigation costs to a minimum is usually regarded as an important
and independent goal. See id.
145. See supra notes 68, 73-77 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
147. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 16, at 804 ("In the context of discovery costs, the
requesting party is, for the most part, unambiguously the cheapest cost avoider."); cf. Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060
(1972) (arguing that a government institution can avoid making a cost-benefit analysis by instead
[Vol. 71:6:18011834
OPTING OUT OF DISCOVERY
eschews discovery garners certain benefits, such as an immunity from
dispositive pretrial motions on the merits and speedier trial, but at the
cost of a potential loss in the accuracy of the judgment. A party who
seeks discovery faces the flip-side costs and benefits as well as the
potential cost of a lost jury trial if the opponent also opts in to discovery.
Presumably each party knows his or her case far better than does the
judge or the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and each
party knows better whether the expected marginal gains to the
lawsuit's value exceed the cost of the discovery.
Of course, this opt-out system imposes new costs that are not
presently part of the system, such as the loss of jury trial and dispositive
merits-based motions in some cases. In cases in which one or both
parties forego discovery, trials themselves might be somewhat lengthier
and costlier. The reasons are simple: the parties will not have pinned
down the witnesses' testimony at depositions, and the parties may not
have access to information that would have enhanced the accuracy of
the judgment.
These costs are offset to some (and perhaps a complete) degree
by two factors. First, a bench trial in cases in which the parties
mutually elect to conduct discovery may enhance the accuracy of the
judgment.148 Second, the absence of discovery will generate savings-
not only eliminating the expense of discovery but also curtailing the
costs associated with discovery motions and with rulings on
unsuccessful dispositive motions.
The proposal also promises to curtail the costs of impositional
discovery by giving the party who believes that it might be the target of
such discovery (typically a defendant) the means to avoid it. The
defendant can opt out of discovery, thus shifting the reasonable costs of
any requested discovery to the plaintiff. Shifting the cost of discovery to
the requesting plaintiff should stop impositional discovery in its
tracks.149 Granted, this protection comes at a price-the defendant's
inability to take any discovery that might help to demonstrate that the
determining which party to an accident "is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis"
and that "[t]he question for the court reduces to a search for the cheapest cost avoider").
148. Whether judges are more accurate factfinders than juries is a debatable point. As I have
discussed, a high degree of judge-jury agreement exists. See supra note 116 and accompanying
text. But studies have shown that juries have enormous difficulty comprehending jury
instructions; judges generally have an excellent grasp of the legal principles that underlie a case.
See Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 449, 454-58 (2006). And judges, unlike juries, must give reasons for their decisions. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) (requiring judges to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law). Judges
also have certain tools-such as deliberating at length, recalling witnesses, and requesting
additional evidence-that are unavailable to juries. Marder, supra, at 463.
149. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs claims are meritless-but many cases of claimed impositional
discovery involve asymmetrical information, in which the plaintiff has
little discoverable information on the case's merits. Moreover, because
the plaintiff has elected to conduct discovery, the defendant can still
employ motions to dismiss or for summary judgment; a defendant need
not conduct discovery to obtain summary judgment.150 By opting out of
discovery, the defendant also signals its belief about the merits of the
claim, so the judge may exercise the court's case-management powers
to ensure that litigation costs remain low. The real savings, however,
derive from the absence of meritless cases that exploit the costliness of
discovery to extort nuisance-value settlements. In an opt-out system,
plaintiffs will no longer file these cases (or else nonsuit them once the
defendant opts out of discovery).
Another efficiency gain is suggested by real-options analysis.
This analysis suggests that plaintiffs will sometimes file economically
unjustified litigation because they incur litigation expenses over time
and can stop spending at any time by dropping the case.15 1 When parties
opt out of discovery, however, the case comes closer to a single-stage
adjudication; merits-based dispositive motions are no longer available.
In single-stage adjudication, plaintiffs can anticipate that they will
incur the full amount of litigation expenses, so they will sue only when
the gains from litigation exceed the costs. As a result, plaintiffs will file
fewer economically unjustified lawsuits.
One potential drag on the efficiency of an opt-out system lies in
its effect on settlement. High costs of litigation are an important
inducement to settle because they create a range within which
150. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (holding that Rule 56 "mandates
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial").
151. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. To explain, assume that the plaintiff seeks to
recover on a claim with an expected value of $100,000 but must spend $150,000 in litigation
expenses. It seems that no rational plaintiff would choose to bring suit. In some cases, however,
the plaintiff will do so as long as the plaintiff can abandon the suit without incurring all $150,000
in expenses. Assume that the plaintiff's claim, if successful, is worth $400,000 (but $0 if
unsuccessful). The plaintiffs outlay for investigating and filing the complaint and then responding
to a motion to dismiss the case is $75,000, and the likelihood of surviving beyond the pleading
stage is fifty percent. If the case survives this first stage, the plaintiff must now invest an
additional $75,000, with the two outcomes ($400,000 and $0) being equally likely. Overall, the
plaintiff has a twenty-five-percent chance of winning the case, so the claim has an expected value
of $100,000. Overall, the costs of prosecuting this claim are $150,000. In deciding whether to
commence the case, however, the plaintiff does not commit all $150,000 at once. Instead, at the
first stage, the plaintiff spends $75,000 in pursuit of a claim with an expected value of $100,000-
a sensible economic proposition. If the plaintiff survives the first stage, he or she now has a fifty-
percent chance to win $400,000, so an expenditure of another $75,000 is also rational.
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settlement can occur.152 In addition, discovery exposes the strengths
and weaknesses of the parties' cases, helping them to make a more
accurate assessment of the lawsuit's expected value.153 When either
party opts out, and especially when both parties opt out, of discovery,
the costs of litigation for the party opting out fall. Moreover, without
discovery into its opponent's case, a party may become unduly
optimistic about the strength of its own case. These effects might
narrow, or even eliminate, the range for settlement.
This concern relies on a disputable assumption: that settlement
of litigation is an intrinsic good.154 Others have decried the low rate of
trial.155 One consequence of the opt-out system might be a greater
number of trials. These trials might be somewhat messier affairs, with
perhaps less accurate results, due to the lack of pretrial discovery. But
two points are worth keeping in mind. First, the parties elect out of
discovery, and no party is likely to do so unless the party perceives that
opting out is economically worthwhile. Second, any losses from more
trials must be offset against the benefits of the opt-out system: reduced
or eliminated discovery costs, more efficient handling of litigation due
to bench trial, and the benefits of trial itself.156
III. THREE CRITIQUES
I have responded to a number of criticisms about the opt-out
proposal as I have developed its elements and justifications. But the
opt-out concept also raises three systemic concerns that merit deeper
consideration.
152. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Assuming that both parties are risk neutral
and agree on the expected value of the lawsuit, the plaintiff should be willing to settle for anything
more than the expected value less the plaintiffs costs of litigation, while the defendant should be
willing to settle for anything less than the expected value plus the defendant's costs of litigation.
153. POSNER, supra note 54, § 21.4.
154. See In re PaineWebber Ltd. P'ships Litig., 147 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing a
"strong judicial policy in favor of settlements"); supra note 56 and accompanying text.
155. See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 414 (2011) ("The aspirations of our
founders for trials in open court and jury trials are not obsolete, and neither is the duty of the
judiciary, within constitutional limits, to respect clearly articulated statutory norms and clearly
articulated legislative policy,"); Galanter, supra note 41, at 531 ("As adjudication is diffused and
privatized, what courts do is changing as they become the site of a great deal of administrative
processing of cases, along with the residue of trials in high-stakes and intractable cases."). But see
Langbein, supra note 20, at 572 (arguing that the discovery-based system is proving so superior to
jury trial that trial is properly becoming "obsolete").
156. For a description of some of the benefits of trial, see Burbank & Subrin, supra note 155,
at 401-03.
18372018]
1838 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:6:1801
A. The Right to Jury Trial
One objection to an opt-out system is the sacrifice of parties'
jury-trial rights. To be clear, this loss occurs only when both parties opt
for discovery; if either party or both parties opt out of discovery, both
sides retain whatever jury-trial rights they otherwise enjoyed. But
strong proponents of jury trial might object that conditioning access to
jury trial on the abandonment of discovery, which is a powerful engine
to determine the merits of a dispute, is unconstitutional and unwise.
To begin, the proposal presents no constitutional difficulty. In
federal court and virtually all state courts, parties enjoy a constitutional
right to jury trial.15 7 Like most constitutional rights, however, parties
can waive the right to a civil jury. 158 Moreover, given its use of the word
"preserved," the Seventh Amendment has always been interpreted with
an eye to the line between law and equity as it existed in 1791.159 In
1791, discovery was available only in equity; actions at common law-
in other words, cases tried to juries-did not permit discovery.1 60 Hence,
conditioning a mutual right to obtain discovery on the absence of a jury
presents no prima facie difficulty.
Perhaps, though, this argument is too facile. Some cases-those
in which only one party opts for discovery-will continue to employ a
jury trial, while others-those in which both parties opt for discovery-
will not. A purely historical approach would permit no discovery in any
jury-tried cases, while the opt-out proposal permits discovery in some
jury-tried cases.
157. In federal court, the Seventh Amendment "preserve[s]" the right to jury trial in "Suits at
common law" that exceed twenty dollars in value. See supra note 106 (quoting the Seventh
Amendment). The Amendment is one of the few guarantees in the Bill of Rights that have never
been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states. See
Gonzdlez-Oyarzun v. Caribbean City Builders, Inc., 798 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2015) ('The Supreme
Court has consistently held that states are not constitutionally required to provide a jury trial in
civil cases."). Forty-eight states (Louisiana and Wyoming being the exceptions) have comparable
jury-trial guarantees in their constitutions. See Robert Wilson, Free Speech v. Trial by Jury: The
Role of the Jury in the Application of the Pickering Test, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 389, 401 &
n. 116 (2008) (collecting state constitutional provisions).
158. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) (providing that the failure to file a jury-trial demand waives the
party's right to jury trial). See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973)
(upholding a criminal defendant's "knowing and intelligent waiver" of a right that "the
Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial"); Democratic Nat'l
Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 205 (3d Cir. 2012) ("The Supreme Court has long
recognized that a party may waive constitutional rights if there is 'clear' and 'compelling' evidence
of waiver and that waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.").
159. The Seventh Amendment was ratified in 1791. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and
Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 875
(2013) ("Even skeptics of the jury concede that the Seventh Amendment text demands some special
attention to history.").
160. See supra notes 22-25, 132-136 and accompanying text.
2018] OPTING OUT OF DISCOVERY 1839
This consequence results from respecting each party's right to
demand a jury. The opt-out system maximizes litigant choice rather
than relying on past markers that divided law from equity. A party
willing to forego a jury can access the discovery system. If an opponent
makes the opposite calculation, preferring jury trial to discovery, that
choice must be respected. Extending discovery to some jury-tried cases
expands the scope of jury trial in relation to historical practice;
expanding rights beyond the constitutional minimum should pose no
difficulty. Moreover, a party willing to forego discovery to obtain a jury
trial gains immunity from dispositive merits-based motions. In a world
in which motions to dismiss and for summary judgment dispose of
perhaps ten times as many cases as trials,161 and in which jury trials
constitute well less than one percent of all dispositions in federal
court,162 the opt-out approach is in fact more protective of jury trial than
the present system.
A different angle of constitutional attack involves the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. When the government (here, a court)
conditions receipt of a government benefit (here, discovery) on the
sacrifice of a constitutional right (here, the civil jury), a concern
arises.163 But the prohibition against such conditions is not absolute.164
To run afoul of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the
government's action must amount to coercion.165 There is nothing
161. Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim terminate claims in two to three percent of
cases. See supra note 43. Motions for summary judgment are successful in another five to ten
percent. See supra note 44.
162. Jury trials resolved only 0.63 percent of all civil cases (1,812 jury trials out of 289,595
terminated cases) in the 2017 fiscal year ending in September. See Judicial Business, supra note
42, at 1 (stating that 0.9 percent of federal civil cases reached trial during the fiscal year ending
on September 30, 2017, with jury trials constituting sixty-eight percent of civil trials (1,812 of
2,663 total civil trials) and bench trials (851 of 2,663 total civil trials) accounting for the remaining
thirty-two percent).
163. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013) ("We have said
in a variety of contexts that the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he
exercises a constitutional right." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983))); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R.
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) ("[T]he power of the state ... is not unlimited, and one of
the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of
constitutional rights.").
164. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (holding that in the context of the
Spending Clause, Congress can condition the receipt of federal aid on the abandonment of a
constitutional right as long as the aid promotes the general welfare, is intended to serve "general
public purposes," is related to the federal interest in the funded program, and is consistent with
other constitutional commands).
165. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 606 ("[T]he unconstitutional conditions doctrine forbids burdening
the Constitution's enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from those who exercise
them."); id. at 607 ("As in other unconstitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede
a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the impermissible denial of a governmental
benefit is a constitutionally cognizable injury."); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
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coercive about limiting jury trial in return for mutual access to
discovery. The mandatory-disclosure provisions in the opt-out system
guarantee that each side will have basic information about the case in
advance of trial even without discovery; moreover, parties can mutually
negotiate for limited discovery even in opt-out cases.166 Controlling
excessive discovery costs requires case-management tactics that are, to
some extent, inconsistent with the structure of jury trial.167 Given that
jury-tried cases at common law received even less in discovery than the
opt-out system provides, it is difficult to argue that the opt-out system
fails to "preserve [ ]" the Seventh Amendment's right to a civil jury.168
Beyond the Constitution, however, lies the jury's value as a
democratic institution.169 For the reasons that I have just described,
however, the opt-out proposal may well result in more jury trials, due
to the abolition of dispositive motions against parties who opt out and
to the effects of lower costs and less information on settlement
patterns.170
In advance of making the system operational, I do not believe
that it is possible to assess the effects of an opt-out approach on the
number of jury trials. Such a reduction in jury trials is certainly
possible, although an increase seems more likely. Even if the number of
jury trials declined (and the number of bench trials increased), some
would applaud the movement toward a system of adjudication more in
line with the methods used elsewhere in the world-especially in an age
when the United States' procedural exceptionalism may need to soften
Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1413, 1506 (1989) (arguing that government can condition benefits
on the waiver of constitutional rights if there is no "government overreaching," no lack of
"evenhandedness," and o creation of an "inappropriate hierarchy among rightholders").
166. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text; cf. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
238 (1980) ("In determining whether a constitutional right has been burdened impermissibly, it
also is appropriate to consider the legitimacy of the challenged governmental practice.").
168. Cf. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 ("[The Constitution does not forbid every government-
imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of
constitutional rights." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412
U.S. 17, 30 (1973))).
169. For such an argument, see Burbank & Subrin, supra note 155, at 401-03. See also SUJA
A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY: RESTORING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE
OF THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL, AND GRAND JURIES 5-6 (2016) (arguing for a restoration of the jury to the
central role envisioned for it by the Founders). But see Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of
the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1353-74 (2012) (arguing that the benefits of the civil jury as a
political institution are overstated).
170. See supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text.
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to accommodate the demands of transnational business and
litigation.171
B. Access to Justice
The opt-out plan's cost-shifting component, under which a
responding party can shift the reasonable cost of discovery to the
requesting party by opting out of discovery, raises concerns in the
David-versus-Goliath context. From the viewpoint of Goliath (usually a
defendant-corporation that possesses nearly all of the discoverable
information), discovery imposes costs that force settlement of meritless
claims. As I have described, the opt-out system gives Goliath the ability
to avoid those impositional costs.1 7 2
From the viewpoint of David, however, the system makes far
more difficult the revelation of information necessary to prove corporate
wrongdoing on a vast scale. Many little guys do not possess the money
to fund the type of broad discovery that is often required to hold large-
scale wrongdoers accountable. Most lawyers also do not possess the
financial wherewithal to fund such discovery or to carry its costs on
their books for years in the hope that discovery will eventually reveal
enough information to bring the defendant to the bargaining table.
Moreover, as the literature on class action lawyers has long noted,
asking lawyers to front discovery expenses creates agency costs, as the
lawyer's enormous stake in the controversy (the recovery of the outlays
on discovery) may lead the lawyer to make litigation decisions in the
best financial interests of the lawyer rather than the client.173 Third-
party financing can step into the breach, but such funding mechanisms
are controversial and siphon money away from injured plaintiffs and
into the pockets of the third-party investors.1 7 4 A requester-pays ystem
might suppress consumer and other David-versus-Goliath litigation,
reducing access to justice for the little guys.
The viewpoints of both sides have validity. We do not want
discovery used to extort unjustified settlements; we also do not want
171. See generally OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN
CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT 55-58 (2005) (describing jury trial as the first element of American
procedural exceptionalism).
172. See supra notes 123, 149-150 and accompanying text.
173. For a classic analysis of the agency costs that class actions impose, see Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12-27 (1991).
174. For a largely positive appraisal of third-party funding, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1338 (2012). For a more
cautious analysis of the system, see Victoria Shannon Sahani, Reshaping Third-Party Funding,
91 TULANE L. REV. 405, 470-72 (2017).
18412018]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
wrongdoers to hide behind their superior access to information. These
concerns play out over a small range of cases-principally those
involving asymmetrical information in which David opts for discovery
and Goliath opts out. The concern for a loss in access to justice for some
must be counterbalanced against the savings from a decline in
impositional litigation and from the overall efficiency of the opt-out
system.
But throwing the concern for individual access to justice onto a
cost-benefit scale cannot be the entire answer.175 A partial solution
could be to allow a court to award a prevailing plaintiff at trial the costs
of discovery; thus, defendants would bear the costs of responding to
discovery in cases in which they were proven to be in the wrong.176
Reallocation of discovery costs away from the requesting party and to
the responding party could also be one subject in settlement
negotiations; presumably, a plaintiff who obtained discovery that
revealed a substantial risk of liability could use that information to
recoup its discovery costs from the defendant. A court's power to award
only reasonable expenses in responding to discovery may also give some
wiggle room; perhaps a judge can defer the plaintiffs reimbursement of
the defendant's expenses in responding to discovery until the end of the
case or deny the defendant reimbursement for a modest amount of
initial discovery that a plaintiff needs to obtain to determine if the case
has merit.177
These solutions are imperfect. Third-party financing, taxing
discovery expenditures as costs, and denial of reimbursement for a
modest amount of exploratory discovery should, in combination, limit
concerns for access to justice. Although economic considerations should
not overbear our policy of open courts, the savings from the elimination
of impositional discovery and other unnecessary discovery are also not
175. For a discussion in a related context, see Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment
on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 170
(2011):
If ... the ordinary civil litigant is priced out or among the millions of pro se
complainants, then courts become the domain of the criminal defendant; of the well-to-
do litigants who opt in rather than buying private dispute resolution services; of the
few constitutional claimants able ... to attract issue-oriented lawyers; and of the
government .... That reduced spectrum of users becomes a problem for the democratic
legitimacy of courts ....
176. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2012) (permitting a court to tax certain costs as a part of the
judgment).
177. Cf. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 16, at 455-56 (proposing a two-stage cost-shifting rule
in which the responding party bears the cost of discovery up to a threshold level "deemed
appropriate for this class of cases, beyond which the reasonable costs of complying with further
discovery requests would shift to the plaintiff').
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irrelevant in determining the proper balance between fostering
corporate accountability and preventing litigation abuse.
There is general agreement hat discovery is a problem only in
a limited number of cases-and cases involving large amounts of
information asymmetrically distributed are the candidates that
typically are singled out as the problem children.
178 The opt-out
proposal is crafted to give both parties some choice in identifying and
responding to these problem cases. Retaining the status quo in the
name of access to justice is another option, but as the myriad changes
in the discovery rules and the rise of case management and
proportionality analysis show, the status quo is increasingly untenable.
The opt-out system provides a simple set of default rules to target
excessive discovery without throwing out a system that, in the main,
appears to function well.
C. Limiting Cost Shifting
The opt-out system's cost-shifting approach can also be critiqued
from a different perspective. Some commentators have called for cost
shifting of discovery in all cases as a means to prevent discovery
abuse.179 The cost shifting in the opt-out proposal is limited to cases in
which one party opts out of discovery; cases in which both parties agree
to conduct discovery operate under existing rules, in which cost shifting,
although possible, is rare.180 Why the costs of discovery do not shift in
all cases is a fair question.
One reason is that the discovery system seems to work
reasonably well in many cases. The opt-out system singles out for
separate cost-shifting treatment those cases in which the present
discovery system seems likely to work least well-the cases of
asymmetrical information. Cost shifting in these cases will impose some
burden on the court, particularly in calculating how much cost shifting
is reasonable.181 There is little reason to expand the scope of that burden
by making cost shifting mandatory in all cases.
Moreover, the opt-out system works through a series of carrots
and sticks. One of the critical carrots intended to induce opting out is
the cost-shifting rule that accompanies the decision to opt out. If cost
178. See supra notes 4-5, 7, 123 and accompanying text.
179. For a sample, see sources cited supra note 16.
180. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (permitting a court to enter an order "specifying terms,
including ... the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery").
181. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 16, at 454 (noting that under a cost-shifting rule for
discovery, the responding party "might hire a more expensive lawyer or waste time gathering
documents" as a way to impose costs on the requesting party).
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shifting occurred in all cases, the incentive for either side to opt out of
discovery would be lessened. In Goliath-versus-David cases, automatic
cost shifting will typically lead the Goliath plaintiff to opt out of
discovery; likewise, in David-versus-Goliath cases, automatic cost
shifting will typically lead the Goliath defendant o opt out of discovery.
Admittedly, even with automatic cost shifting, some incentives for
Goliath to opt out remain: immunity from dispositive pretrial motions
and retention of jury-trial rights can be powerful motivators in some
situations. But in most cases, cost shifting is the critical carrot. That
possibility is especially salient in the asymmetrical-information cases
of greatest concern. If cost shifting applied across the board, Goliath
defendants in asymmetrical-information cases would have much less
reason to opt out; as defendants, they gain little from an immunity to
dispositive motions, and they are unlikely to prefer jury trial. The same
is true of Goliath plaintiffs. As a result, the savings that are realized
due to the Goliath party's decision to opt out of discovery are lost.
The final reason that the opt-out system does not include across-
the-board cost shifting, however, is the concern for access to justice that
the prior Section discussed. Cost shifting in all cases is likely to
discourage filings from impecunious plaintiffs, whose claims are no less
important than those of moneyed parties. The opt-out system is less
discouraging to plaintiffs, for defendants have some reason (such as
avoidance of jury trial) to choose to conduct discovery and thus bear
their own discovery costs. Obviously, when filing suit, the plaintiff does
not know whether the defendant will elect to engage in discovery or opt
out, so the plaintiff runs some risk that the defendant will opt out of
discovery, thus shifting the cost of the plaintiffs discovery back to the
plaintiff. But the chance of cost shifting that the opt-out system creates
is less discouraging to impecunious plaintiffs than the certainty of cost
shifting that arises under an automatic cost-shifting rule.
CONCLUSION
Discovery seeks to ensure that case-relevant information is
disclosed so that legal claims are adjudicated accurately. Economic
reality, in particular the costliness of discovery, necessarily constrains
this goal. In recent years, discovery reform has sought to recalibrate the
balance between accuracy and efficiency, with an increasing emphasis
on keeping costs down. The basic reformist intuition is proportionality:
make sure that requested discovery is worth the price.
In the real world, judges lack the information to make correct
assessments about the proportionality of discovery requests. The best
that we can hope for is to establish default rules that approximate
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efficient results across large swaths of discovery. Given that overly
expensive discovery seems to be a problem confined to a small sector of
the litigation world, it is important to design solutions that, to the
largest extent possible, target problem litigation without ruining a
discovery system that performs fairly well in the mine-run of cases.
That intuition underlies the opt-out approach. It begins with the
belief that in our adversarial culture, the lawyers know much more than
the judge about their cases, the evidence that they possess, and the
evidence that they need. The system then empowers them to make
elections to participate in or withdraw from discovery.
Given the inertia of the present system, some incentives are
necessary to make the lawyers seriously contemplate opting out of the
discovery system. These incentives-immunity from dispositive pretrial
motions, retention of jury-trial rights, and cost shifting should the
opponent wish to conduct discovery-are tailored to address the reasons
that discovery exists and the problems that discovery poses.
In a world in which the right to discovery is universal, an opt-
out system is a bold reform. As the last Part suggested, a serious risk of
the proposal is the potentially negative impact on parties' access to
justice. Other unintended consequences, like manipulation of the
system to take strategic advantage of the incentives, are also likely. For
these reasons, the best way to implement an opt-out system may be a
pilot project, in which the possible side effects of an opt-out system can
be monitored and the system adjusted.182 In making an opt-out system
operational, rulemakers and judges must bear in mind the first
principles that were the impulse for the opt-out proposal: ensure that
discovery is conducted only when necessary and only when cost-
effective.
182. See generally Jeffrey S. Sutton & Derek A. Webb, Bold and Persistent Reform: The 2015
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 2017 Pilot Projects, JUDICATURE,
Autumn 2017, at 12-21 (touting the benefits of pilot projects on discovery reform).
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